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Abstract 
 
China has slowly but steadily become an important partner for numerous countries of the world, 
establishing its presence in every continent. China’s strength lays in its economic power which 
grants it the ability to heavily invest abroad, through direct investments, but also aid, trade 
agreements and so forth. EU member states are among the destinations of such investments. 
Thus, when a few EU member states started to adopt a disruptive behaviour in debates at EU 
level, preferring a pro-China stand over the general EU position, the suspect that China was 
using economic means such as Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) to influence the EU political 
process started to spread. Without going as far as claiming that China is willingly using 
investments to influence the European politics, this paper analyses whether FDIs have a 
negative impact on the integration process of the EU. Since one of the most famous episodes 
of disruption regards Greece, which has been a major receiver of Chinese investments in the 
past few years, this research paper compares Greece with another European country which 
shares high degrees of similarities with, but which has not shown disruptive behaviour in China-
related matters at EU level; Italy, using the most-similar systems design. The results suggest 
that inbound Chinese investments have a negative impact on the integration process when such 
investments match the interests of member states, some more than others. Apparently, Greece 
adopted a disruptive behaviour, while Italy did not, due to the type and conditions of its 
economy, which is weak and small, but most importantly, it heavily relies on import of capital 
and goods. Thus, attracting further Chinese capital is more in the interests of the import-oriented 
Greece than of the export-oriented Italy. Therefore, EU countries sharing similar characteristics 
could also be negatively influenced by the inflow of Chinese investments, as far as the EU 
integration process is concerned.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
 
‘China will [..] always be a builder of world peace, contributor of global development and 
keeper of international order’. It is January 2018, and Xi Jinping, President of the People 
Republic of China (PRC), inaugurates the new year with these words (Menjie, 2018). Since his 
first mandate, started in 2013, Xi has been reshaping China and, most of anything else, its 
foreign policy, turning a once developing country into one of the most relevant and active actors 
on the world stage (Tao, 2017).  
 
The renewed Chinese push for a more proactive role in the global dynamics was visible way 
before President Xi made it explicit. In the past years, China has been increasing its involvement 
and presence in numerous regions, from the nearer South East and Central Asia to the further 
Africa and South America, reaching to the European capitals (Cardenal & Araujo, 2014, pp. 5-
10). According to Cardenal and Araujo (2014, p.40) its people are the key of such worldwide 
presence, ready to move to new lands and start flourishing businesses abroad. Although it would 
be interesting to look at how Chinese migrants create one of the pillars of China’s successful 
foreign policy, another phenomenon, maybe less volatile, but certainly not less complicated, 
has recently received the attention of numerous scholars and practitioners; Chinese investments 
abroad.  
 
When it comes to its engagement abroad, China usually propagates the use of the ‘win-win’ 
formula. According to the Cambridge dictionary (2018),  a ‘win-win’ formula is a ‘situation or 
result [..] that is good for everyone who is involved’; in the case of China, it is an agreement 
that is advantageous for both China and its partner(s). One of the most looked at cases regarding 
the destination of Chinese capital has been Africa; for years, China has been investing in the 
African continent following the ‘win-win’ formula. Chinese capital has been deployed mainly 
in the African infrastructure sector which was lingering well behind, in exchange, the Africans 
have been providing China with raw materials, of which China is in need for its fast-paced 
economic development (Ferrari, 2008, p.71).  
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Chinese investments are having widespread success in Africa as claimed by Ferrari (2008, p.71) 
and Cardenal & Araujo (2014, pp. 5-10); China’s money does not come with any strings 
attached (Tseng & Krog, 2015, p.3), distinguishing itself from the so-called Western approach, 
according to which money and loans are often conditional to the fulfilment of certain 
requirements (IMF, 2018). However, what does it mean to have no strings attached? It is easily 
explained in China’s Five Principle of Mutual Coexistence, which are the five pillars at the 
basis of Chinese foreign policy, namely; ‘mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence’ (Nathan & Ross, 1997). China has been doing business with 
most countries of the world following these Principles. In other words, Chinese money comes 
with no requirements related to, for example, human rights, rule of law or democracy, as 
including clauses on these matters would entail interfering with the sovereignty and internal 
affairs of the partner country. On the contrary, Western money has always been conditional to 
certain requirements often linked to the three points mentioned above, and thus, interfered with 
the internal affairs of the receiver state (IMF, 2018).  
 
However, the no-strings-attached option offered by China has been exacerbating illiberal 
situations in the African continent (Nathan, 2015). ‘China has become very powerful and 
indirectly influences the policies of its African partners [..] has been able occupy a place that 
has been neglected by the West’ says Evariste Ngarlem Tolde, an expert in economics from 
Chad, in an interview to Andolu Agency in 2015 (“Analista africano: "L’influenza cinese nel 
continente è inarrestabile", 2015).  Opaque and corrupted governments have become stronger, 
inflicting a painful damage to the efforts made during the years to grant freer and fairer societies, 
but most importantly deteriorating the conditions which numerous Africans are working under 
(Ferrari, 2008, p.71). Famous is the case of the Congolese miners working to extract coltan 
under what could be defined as inhumane circumstances (Fagge, 2015), or the infamous episode 
which took place in 2010 in Zambia, when Chinese executives shot the miners working in a 
coal mine while they were protesting against low pay (Laing, 2010). According to Andrew 
Nathan (2015), Professor of political science at Columbia University, the Chinese government 
through investments and economic ties has manged to obtain a high degree of political leverage 
over the African governments, this has been possible to achieve thanks to the growing economic 
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dependence that many African countries and industry sectors are developing vis à vis Chinese 
money (Economy Watch, 2015). The same argument has been presented by Raess, Wagner and 
Ren (2017, p.24); by analysing the voting behaviour of African countries at the UN, a shift has 
been noticed towards a re-alignment in favour of China. 
 
However, as briefly mentioned a few paragraphs above, in the past few years, China has 
increased its presence and investments in Europe as well. The majority of the EU member states 
have seen a steady increase in capital coming from China, which has received a boost after the 
launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and of the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank 
(AIIB). The BRI ‘is an immensely ambitious development campaign to boost trade and 
stimulate economic growth across Asia and beyond’ (Chatham House, 2018). As shown in 
fig.1, the BRI is a net of linked infrastructures all around the globe, connecting various 
continents and regions via land and via sea, which partially explains the increase in investments 
directed to EU member states. Although these investments are mainly focused on the 
infrastructure sector, they are not limited to it ,covering a diversity of sectors (see section 5.4). 
 
Figure 1. Belt and Road Intiative 
 
(Source: The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved at http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/P1-
BR865_CAPEC_16U_20141107194517.jpg on 21/05/2018) (“New Silk Roads,” 2018) 
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Following the increase in Chinese investments directed to European countries, one might 
wonder whether they could have a similar effect to the one manifested in the African continent; 
granting China a certain degree of political leverage over member states and strengthening the 
existence and rise of illiberal regimes and corruption (Nathan, 2015) (Raess et al., 2017), 
leading to a pro-China re-alignment of voting behaviour of member states within the EU. The 
concern is that the more the amount of inbound Chinese capital in the EU increases the more 
the level of economic dependence of the receiving member states on China grows, as it has 
happened in Africa (Economy Watch, 2015). 
 
Recently, a group of European researchers (Benner et al., 2018, pp.5-8) has claimed that this is 
already happening, and China, through various means among which investments, is gaining 
growing political leverage over certain member states. The arguments presented in favour of 
this claim will be further shown in the section dedicated to the literature review, for the moment, 
suffice to say that such claim is arguable.  
 
Nevertheless, in June 2017, at the UN, Greece blocked a unified statement from the EU which 
condemned the condition of human rights in the People Republic of China. Such action sparked 
outrage at international level where questions arose wondering why Greece, member of a Union 
that strives for the respect of human rights worldwide, would be opposed to such statement 
(Emmott & Koutantou, 2017). In the same year, Hungary has rejected the proposal to sign a 
common joint document in which the EU was condemning the torture of arrested Chinese 
lawyers in the PRC (Benner at al., 2018, p.16). Both countries, at different degrees, have been 
receiving increasing investments from China and where seeking to attract more Chinese capital 
(Seaman et al., 2017, p.71) 
 
However, these episodes and others, some of which will be later explored, show that matters 
connected to China are becoming increasingly sensitive in the EU and that discrepancies are 
being manifested among its member states when China-related issues are touched upon.  
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The more these episodes take place, the more the awareness of a potential phenomenon 
evolving in the EU grows. Recently, certain EU countries (France, Germany and Italy) have 
proposed a centralised EU screening mechanism for incoming Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI), which seems to have been triggered by the increase in the inflow of Chinese investments 
in the region (Van der Putter, 2018). Such proposal has probably been triggered by the 
increasing inflow of Chinese investments in the EU (Van der Putten, 2018). The decisional 
process is not over yet, the European Parliament will vote in the Plenary session fixed for the 
last week of May 2018, but alredy at Council level objections came from various members 
(Benner et al., 2018, p.16).  
 
By observing these facts, one might wonder whether Chinese foreign investments directed to 
the EU member states are exercising a negative influence on the unity and cohesion of the EU, 
mainly in its ability to act and speak as a unified actor. This will be the focus of the research 
that is being developed in these pages. Without going into whether this is the result of China’s 
plan to obtain more political leverage over the EU or whether China desires to divide the EU 
through soft-power means, this research aims at finding an answer to the following question: 
Under which circumstances do investments from China that are directed to the member states 
of the European Union have a negative impact on the EU’s integration process? 
 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) have been selected for the analysis and not other forms of 
incoming capital and/or goods have been selected, such as trade or loans. The reasons are, first, 
FDIs are often mentioned in relation with the disruptive episodes among which the ones 
mentioned above; second, FDIs imply a long-term commitment and the construction of a long-
standing relationship between the investing country and the hosting one, which is not 
necessarily required by the other forms mentioned. Moreover, FDIs require time to produce 
wealth, but they have the ability to bring a ‘significant contribution’ to the GDP, as they also 
provide the opportunity to employ internal human capital and resources, thus boosting not only 
internal growth, but also employments  (World Trade Organisation, 2016).  
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Already in 2009, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a document that very 
comprehensively analysed the relationship between China and the EU, including numerous of 
its potential consequences and policy advices to address them. The entire publication is based 
on the idea that national interests will always be prioritized over the interests of the European 
Union (Fox & Godement, 2009, p.30); such is also the argument at the core of the 
intergovernmentalist theory (Hoffmann, 1995). In other words, if a member state sees in China 
a partner that will allow it to fulfil its interests, it might take that option without considering the 
effect such decision could have on the European Union. If such claim is proven to be right, it 
would not only endorse the intergovernmentalist theory, but it would also offer the image of a 
fragile EU easily subjected to external influences.  
 
Moreover, extensive literature on European integration (Haas, 1958) (Nicoll & Salomon, 1994) 
shows that economic prosperity is one of the factor at the basis of the foundation and success 
of the EU. The membership to the Union was, in fact, seen as an effective mean to reach 
economic prosperity, thus, it was in the interest of member states and applicants to be part of 
such project (Anderson & Reichert, 1995). Following the 2008 financial crisis, the EU has 
sharply decreased the amount of investments in its member states, leaving them with less 
economic support from Brussels (European Commission, 2017), moreover, the overall 
prosperity of the European economy has been crippled and, in some cases, the recovery has 
been difficult (Blyth, 2013, p.53). Meanwhile China slowly, but steadily increased its 
engagement and inflow of money in the region through bilateral or sub-regional agreements, 
somehow filling the void that the crisis had created (Hahnemann, 2017).  
 
Looking at the examples previously mentioned regarding Greece and Hungary, the way in 
which Chinese investments can undermine the integration process of the EU and the existence 
of the Union itself becomes clearer (Webber, 2014). Firstly, by damaging its image as a united 
reality, publicly showing disunity and instability. Secondly, by crippling its ability to act as a 
unified actor and thirdly, by slowly deteriorating the basis of the integration process; 
exacerbating differences, fomenting competition and creating the illusion of a better alternative 
to a fully integrated and cohesive EU.  
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Thus, if the research was to discover that the presence of Chinese investments in the EU is 
exercising such negative influence, then, an extremely relevant mechanism will be unveiled. 
Nonetheless, once the existence of such phenomenon has been consolidated, understanding 
under which circumstances it is triggered, not only would be interesting from an academic point 
of view, but also useful and relevant for the future development of the society and of potential 
policy recommendations. 
 
In order to find an answer to the question presented above, this research paper will be developed 
in the following way. First, a chapter dedicated to reviewing the available and relevant literature 
on the topic will be presented, followed by a chapter focusing on explaining the theoretical 
framework and debate in which the research is embedded, in this chapter the main hypothesis 
will be presented and discussed. Then, a few paragraphs will be spent to show the methodology 
adopted, followed by the analysis. A first part of the analysis will present the characteristics of 
the case studies in relation to the variables considered, a second part will be dedicated to the 
relationship between the different variables in the case studies. Finally, results will be presented, 
conclusions will be drawn, and a few policy advices will be given.  
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
 
 
The researched topic, Chinese investments in the EU, is relatively new, as the amount of such 
investments has been quite low for several years, and only recently has started to rise (Rhodium 
Group, 2018). Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, it has attracted the attention different 
scholars and researchers. Thus, the available literature on the matter is quite extensive and of 
various nature, but not entirely comprehensive and satisfactory, which is an understandable 
trait, since the phenomenon is not only still developing, but also seems to be at its early stage. 
In the past, the attention focused more on Chinese action and investments in the African 
continent, where the Asian power has been investing for longer time in terms of money, 
infrastructure, but also human capital, and where the impact of such investments on the society 
is more evident (Nathan, 2015). For example, recently, the Dutch think tank Clingendael has 
published a report which analyses in-depth the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, looking 
at Ethiopia as a case study (Ursu & van den Berg, 2018). 
 
However, this is just one of the most recent example of literature focussing on the relationship 
between China and African countries. Already in 2008, Angelo Ferrari published a book in 
which he looked at the whole African continent and its relationship with China, focusing on 
how it influenced the society, the economy and the politics. Nevertheless, as the book published 
by Juan Pablo Cardenal and Hariberti Araujo in 2013, it is the result of a journalistic enquiry, 
based on description of events, interviews and testimonies (Cardenal & Araujo, 2018). 
Although interesting from certain aspects, the conclusions the authors reach are a little too far-
fetched compared to the evidences presented in the book and do not seem to be drawn from a 
systematic and scientific approach. Nevertheless, both books ended up portraying a China ready 
to conquer the African continent through economic deals and political influence, careless of the 
costs the local population might incur into. Such argument is useful in light of the parallelism 
that can be drawn between Africa and the EU, as receiver of Chinese capital. Nevertheless, the 
lack of scientific approach and the differences between the two subjects, Africa (developing 
region) and the EU (developed region), makes it difficult to proceed with such comparison. 
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One of the earliest and most comprehensive analysis of the impact of China in the EU was not 
a product of the academic world, but by the European Council on Foreign Policy in 2009. Such 
document takes the much broader angle of the overall relationship between China and the EU 
and it does not say much on the specific topic of Chinese investments. Such broader approach 
can be better understood by looking at the exiguity of Chinese investments in the EU in 2009 
and the years that preceded it (Hahnemann, 2017, p.4). Nevertheless, the report titled ‘A power 
audit of EU-China relations’, provides us with plenty of general information regarding the 
relationship between China and the EU (Fox & Godement, 2009). Moreover, thanks to its 
country-based approach, such information can be used to compare how the attitudes of the 
different EU countries towards China have changed through the years. 
 
Nevertheless, Chinese presence already at the time it created disunity in the EU, as a non-united 
EU vision is displayed in the decisional process regarding the type of approach to be adopted 
towards the Asian power (Fox & Godement, 2009). One might argue that the EU struggles in 
conveying a united vision also in matters that have little or nothing to do with China; it would 
be true, but irrelevant for the purpose of this research, as we are trying to assess whether Chinese 
investments have a negative influence on integration, not which are the various variables that 
might cause disruption among member states. However, already in 2009, when the amount of 
Chinese investments inflow to the EU was much smaller (Rhodium Group, 2018), the member 
states were already divided on how to approach the expansion of the Asian power (p.28).  
 
According to the report, such division goes to the advantage of China, which can exploit it to 
strike more convenient deals with the single member states rather than having to adhere to a 
common line (p.30). For such reason, the authors of the report conclude that a common EU 
approach to China is extremely important and needed to respond to the expansion and aspiration 
of the Asian power and save the unity of the EU (p.18).  
 
The European Council on Foreign Policy then, in 2017 published a follow up of the 2009 report. 
Such report acknowledges the changes that took place in the almost ten years that passed from 
its predecessor and proposes four ‘priorities’ that are further elaborated in the body of the text: 
complete the construction of an EU-wide system of investment screening, replace dispersion 
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with common strategies, prevent new investment rules from affecting other aspects of relations 
and leverage Europe’s like-mined partners in Asia’ (Godement & Vasselier, 2017, p.4). In other 
words, it more strongly and precisely repurposes the same arguments presented in 2009. For 
example, the 2017 report explicitly mentions the Commission proposal for a centralised 
investments screening mechanism as an effective tool to respond to the different approaches 
taken by the member states towards Chinese capital (Godement & Vasselier, 2017, p.8). 
 
The same line of thinking is adopted by Sophie Meunier (2014) in her paper ‘Divide and 
Conquer. China and the cacophony of foreign investments rules in the EU’. The author argues 
that the unregulated and divided acceptance of Chinese investments can create political division 
within the EU member states by applying a ‘centrifugal force’. Meunier goes even further by 
saying that China is exploiting such division and taking advantage of it to further exacerbate 
the differences between ‘capital importing and capital exporting’ member states, with the aim 
to divide ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ (Meunier, 2014). Although the presented conclusion and 
reasoning behind it are arguable as the author herself presents very little evidence is support of 
such allegation, the importance given to the difference between ‘capital importing and capital 
exporting’ member states in responding to Chinese investments is considered to be of particular 
relevance in analysing the conditions under which Chinese investments have a negative 
influence for the integration process. The author also furnished a table containing all the 
different apparatus of screening methods in place, or not in place, in each EU member state. 
Such table is useful to understand firstly, how variegated the member states’ panorama is in 
terms of screening methods for foreign investments, and secondly, distinguish between those 
states that have a screening method already in place and those that do not (Meunier, 2014). A 
visualisation of the same information can be found in a report made by the research centre 
within the European Parliament, EPRS (Fig.2) (EPRS, 2018). 
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Figure 2. Screening mechanism in the EU 
 
(Source: EPRS. Retrieved at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156040.pdf on 12/05/2018) 
 
In the same paper, Meunier (2014) also presents a counterargument to the ‘centrifugal force’ 
exercised by the investments. The author argues that Chinese investments can exercise a 
‘centripetal force’ on member states; levelling differences instead of exacerbating them 
(Meunier, 2014).  If the EU member states were to realize the necessity of a common approach 
to Chinese inbound investments and create a common scheme to address them, they would 
overcome their differences, strengthening their cohesion and integration (Meunier, 2014). 
Nevertheless, such counterargument presents two problems; the first is that it does not compose 
a counterargument to the centrifugal effect, but more a solution to it; the second is that for the 
moment, EU states seem to be struggling in finding a common position on the matter (Benner 
et al., 2018). 
 
A more positive angle on Chinese investment in the EU is presented by a research conducted 
by Professor Jeremy Clegg and Doctor Hinrich Voss, who published their findings in 2014 for 
the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN). The researchers are both 
economists, thus analyse the issue systematically, looking at the data available and comparing 
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them (Clegg & Voss, 2014, p.63). They come to a critical conclusion towards negative views 
that were and still are developing in Europe in face of Chinese investments.  
 
First of all, they give a more realistic dimension of the amount of Chinese investments in the 
EU, while the general impression is that Chinese capitals are invading the member states’ 
markets, they present data showing a different reality; the amount of investments is indeed 
rising, but it is still very limited. This piece of information is still applicable today, although 
since 2014 the amount of capital invested by China in the EU has sharply risen, it is still 
relatively limited (Seaman et al, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, they disprove the idea that behind such investments there is a sort of centralized 
‘evil’ intent (pp. 72-73). In fact, according to the authors, Chinese investors are incredibly 
cautious on where and how to invest, such claim is also supported by the former Greek minister 
of finance, Yannis Varoufakis in his most recent book (Varoufakis, 2017, pp.313-316). The 
authors go even further and claim that the fragmentation of the member states’ response is not 
an advantage for Chinese investors, on the contrary, it is an obstacle.  While previous works 
(Meunier, 2014) (Godement & Vasselier, 2017) argued that fragmentation was advantageous 
for China as it could obtain better deals through bilateral agreements, Clegg and Voss (2014) 
argue the opposite; for Chinese investors being aware of and dealing with 28 different 
bureaucratic systems instead that with one is actually disadvantageous (Clegg & Voss, 2014, 
pp.70-71). Thus, for the first time the literature analysed so far, authors argue that the lack of 
cohesion among member states is perceived as an obstacle by Chinese investors rather than an 
advantage to be exploited.  
 
Aware that in the years to come the amount of Chinese investments was set to grow, the authors 
add that such increase would have led the Chinese investors to require guidance from the EU 
to clarify where their investments were welcomed and where they were not (Clegg & Voss, 
2014, p.11). This argument further strengthens and supports the claims made in the previous 
paragraph and it rules in favour of a more centralized EU. This would allow the rest of the 
world, and in this case, the Chinese counterpart to have a clear idea of how to move vis à vis 
Brussels and the member states (Clegg & Voss, 2014, p.11).  
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess whether the claims brought forward by Clegg and Voss are 
indeed true. For example, China has spoken in opposition to the centralised screening 
mechanism launched by the Commission (Xinhua, 2017). There is also who claims that such a 
tool would lead to a trade war between the European Union and the Asian power due to the 
potential limitation it might set for foreign investments in general, and Chinese investments in 
particular (Brunsden, 2017). All this information, however, does not exclude the option of 
China adopting a mixed approach vis à vis the EU and its member states, preferring a more or 
less centralised response according to the situation. 
 
This is the reason why Francoise Nicolas (2014, p.2) claims that a ‘systematic approach to 
regulating inbound foreign investments in the EU’ is a vital step for the EU, seconding the 
argument brought forward by Meunier (2014) and the authors of the reports from the European 
Council on Foreign Policy (2017). Although she supports the idea presented by Clegg and Voss 
(2014, p.33) that the fear behind such investments is excessive compared to their amount, she 
sees the systematic approach from member states and the centralised response from Brussels as 
the solution to more than just one problem (Nicolas, 2014, p.34). Such approach would prevent 
states who fear Chinese investments from taking a protectionist stand, as it would protect them 
from potential security risks, while at the same time assuring that the amount of Chinese 
investments does not become excessive in states whose enthusiasm might lead the to accept as 
much Chinese capital as possible without the necessary previous evaluation (Nicolas, 2014, 
pp.33-34).  However, Nicolas (2014, p.33) acknowledges that the creation of such mechanism 
could be particularly difficult due to national differences, and that the better way to address the 
issue would be to know and use the systems already in place in the different countries.  
 
Thus, scholars seem to be divided between those that see China and its investments as positive 
and those that see them as negative for the unity of the EU, the nuances to the phenomenon and 
its interpretation are, however, much more complex. Unfortunately, there is scarce availability 
of literature studying the impact of FDIs on regional integration, as the main literature focuses 
on understanding the conditions and characteristics to attract foreign investments (Asiedu, 
2006), why some actors are more successful than others in doing so (te Velde & Bezemer, 2004) 
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and how regional organisation attract foreign direct investments (Clegg, Forsans, & Reilly, 
2003). Literature can be found on the impact regional integration has on FDI flows 
(Balasubramanyam et al., 2002), but not vice-versa. 
 
This is why it is important to keep studying the phenomenon and to embed it in a wider 
theoretical spectrum (see Chapter III). However, since the available information are so far 
limited, a big part of the literature review will be dedicated to reports produced by various 
European think-tanks. 
 
As previously mentioned, China attracted the attention of numerous European researchers; in 
2014 the European Think Tank Network for China (ETNC) was created, showing the increasing 
degree of interest in Europe for the Asian power. ETNC produced a series of reports covering 
the relationship between the EU and China from different angles. Three reports from ETNC 
will be presented here in chronological order, from 2015 to 2017. Although they all proceed in 
the analysis of the relationship between EU and China from different perspective, they all share 
a common characteristic; the analysis is country-based. The various reports are divided in 
chapters and each chapter is dedicated to a EU member state, however, not all member states 
are presented in each report.   
 
The first report to be presented was published in 2015; its aim is to look more in general at the 
relationship between the two entities. Thus, it does not say much regarding investments, but it 
contains several useful information on the overall EU-China rapport. First of all, in the 
introduction, the topic of a fast-changing relationship is addressed, mainly from the Chinese 
side; picturing a country that is becoming increasingly proactive in its presence in the European 
continent (pp.7-14). More interesting, however, are the lines and paragraphs offering the image 
of a EU composed by member states who not only are unable to find a common response to 
such new Chinese enthusiastic push, but also enter into competition with each other to see who 
can attract more Chinese capital (pp.7-14). The added value of this report is found in the 
following sentence; ‘rather than resulting from a deliberate Chinese strategy, intra-European 
competition, or lack of coordination over China usually stems from deficiencies within Europe 
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itself. It is Europe’s own malaise, coupled with China’s growing economic clout that often fuels 
intra-European competition, or even rivalry ’ (Huotari et al., 2015, p.9).   
 
Although very similar, our main claim does not entirely coincide with the argument states 
above, in fact, although there is an agreement in seeing the member states as the principal 
perpetrator of an eventual EU disintegration, the stress on the role played by Chinese 
investments is stronger. This idea seems to be partially supported by the authors of the report 
in the use of the word ‘coupled’. However, it remains unclear whether there are specific 
circumstances under which Chinese investments exercise a negative influence over the 
integration of the EU.  
 
The report shares an important piece of information; ‘there have been a number of media reports 
suggesting that Beijing threw its political weight behind Athens back in 2011-12, at a time when 
Greece was on the verge of leaving the Eurozone. Reportedly, it was in the interest of China to 
see a Eurozone that was as stable as possible, which would have been difficult to achieve in the 
case Greece had been forced to relinquish the Euro’ (Huotari et al., 2015). Looking at the 
information furnished in the previous lines, the impression would be that China’s political will 
supports a united and stable EU. However, this does not counter-prove the idea that the effect 
of Chinese investments might be detached and thus, different from the political desire of the 
Asian power or the possibility that China applies different techniques in different circumstances 
according to its interests. 
 
The following ETNC report focuses on the Belt and Road Initiative, hence, on investments 
related to fields such as ‘transport, energy, financial or telecommunication infrastructure in 
Asia, Europe or Africa’(Van der Putten at al., 2016, p.3). In particular, as far as Europe is 
concerned, the fields of transports and related infrastructures are analysed, looking at the type 
of project that are taking place in the various member states (Van der Putten at al., 2016, pp.3-
10).  
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The report shows that there are numerous Chinese actors and businesses involved in the process 
and, interestingly, they do not necessarily explicitly act under the flag of the BRI. For example, 
COSCO, a state-owned enterprise (SOE), heavily invested in the Piraeus Port in Greece and in 
many other EU countries but does not operate directly for the creation of the BRI. In fact, many 
of COSCO’s projects are older than the launch of the initiative itself, however, if united and 
‘re-interpreted’, they seem to compose a net of connections between the various nations and 
continents which would contribute to the BRI (Van Der Putten et al., 2016, pp.30-34).  
 
According to the authors of the report, the Mediterranean area seems to occupy a special role 
in China’s radar, as a geographical zone with plenty of possibilities in terms of routes to the 
sea, harbours and hence, direct access to numerous European countries. Nevertheless, according 
to information furnished by the report, it is clear that Chinese interests are way broader and 
more flexible; of the fourteen countries analysed, eight already have concrete projects being 
realized under the BRI flag, twelve are included or interested in some way and only two 
(Denmark and Sweden) do not seem to have any linkage with the project. This information is 
only partially still valid; as Denmark is getting closer ties with China and hopes for future 
further collaboration (Jing, 2017); while in Sweden, the Chinese were meant to build a deep 
water port, but the project was aborted following the concerns of the population for the 
environmental effect it would have had (Suokas, 2018). 
 
Nevertheless, the impact of the BRI-related projects in the EU member states is still limited 
(Van Der Putten et al., 2016, pp.3-10). Even in such scenario, however, it is easy to perceive 
and see a fragmented European Union; although many states are somehow involved in the 
project, some are more enthusiastic than others (Van Der Putten et al., 2016, pp.3-10), as the 
way in which China, its presence and its capital are perceived in the various member states is 
also different  (Eurobarometer, 2017). Building on this, our research aims to explain and further 
explore whether and under which conditions such difference can lead to an eventual disruption 
of the integration process exacerbating differences and division.  
 
Finally, in 2017 ETNC published a report that covers the focus of our research; Chinese 
investments in the EU. A few words will be spent on the introduction titled ‘Growing concerns’ 
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(Seaman et al., 2017, pp.12-14). It contains a bullet-point list presenting some motives of 
concern for the Europeans when dealing with Chinese capital; among others, it can be found 
‘Investments as a source of political and geopolitical influence, and divisions within Europe 
and Intra-European competition for investment’ (Seaman et al., 2017, p.12). Although, as 
previously mentioned, this research will not dig into the direct political leverage China might 
or might not exercise on the receiver of its investments in the EU, this point remains relevant, 
as it mentions both the ‘divisions within Europe’ and the ‘intra-European competition for 
investment’. Both these elements entail a component of fracture rather than further unity and 
cohesion and their manifestation seems to be linked to Chinese investments. Thus, of the three 
reports published by ETNC here presented (Huotari et al., 2015) (Van Der Putten et al., 2016), 
this (Seaman et al., 2017) is closer to the purpose of our research.  
 
The reports introduces the European debate around Chinese investments and touches upon the 
proposal launched by Germany, France and Italy, and advanced by the European Commission 
for a ‘a common European framework for screening foreign direct investment into the EU’ 
(Seaman et al., 2017, pp.38-39).  
 
Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, such proposal has created problems from a series of angles, 
and although the ‘EU-wide investment screening framework, [..] is said to have been triggered 
primarily by Chinese investments in the EU’ (Van Der Putten, 2018), China and its capital are 
not the only driving motives for division on the matter. In fact, there are concerns among smaller 
European states that a centralized mechanism might become a weapon in the hands of the bigger 
European powers to control incoming investments, leaving them with little freedom (Seaman 
et al., 2017, pp.38-39). The debate is still open, and the cohort of states opposed to the 
mechanism is variegated, ranging from small and extremely liberal states such as Denmark and 
The Netherlands to bigger, but more troubled states such as Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Greece (Seaman et al., 2017, pp.38-39). The last three countries mentioned occupy a special 
role in the framework of this research, as they are among the EU member states that have spoken 
up in opposition to the EU general position to take a stand favourable to China (Benner et al., 
2018, p.16), perhaps then, the opposition to the centralised screening mechanism could be more 
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directly linked to Chinese investments than in the cases of Denmark and The Netherlands 
(Seaman et al., 2017, pp.13-14). 
 
Although there are several sources (Clegg & Voss, 2014, pp.70-71) (Seaman et al., 2017, p.10) 
arguing that China is seeking to invest and expand in a regulated environment, it is not clear 
whether it is seeking, as far as the EU is concerned, a Brussels-regulated environment. After 
all, so far, China has given the impression to favour bilateral relations (Huotari et al., 2015, 
p.7). Moreover, although the debate on a centralized EU screening mechanism for investments 
has been going on for several months now, China has never shown any support for it. One 
would think that if China was seeking a centrally regulated environment in the EU, it would 
have signalled its support to the Commission’s proposal, however, this has not happened. On 
the contrary, the Chinese government has voiced strong concerns over the adoption of such 
mechanism by the EU, further claiming that the disadvantages of such tool would outweigh the 
advantages (Xinhua, 2017). Perhaps, then, China aims for clearer rules to ‘play the game’, as 
argued by the ETNC’s report (2017), but not for a unified EU rule, as argued by Clegg and 
Voss (2014).  
 
As far as the more general relation between Chinese FDI and European Integration is 
concerned, the variegated and divisive reactions EU countries have displayed in regard to the 
common European screening mechanism for FDIs suggest that Chinese investments have the 
potential to cause disruption in the cohesion of the member states.  
 
In 2018, the German think-tank MERICS, published a rather controversial report titled: 
‘Authoritarian Advance. Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe’ 
(Benner et al., 2018). As suggested by title, the report’s aim is to prove that China is developing, 
through various means, strong political leverage over member states (Benner et al., 2018, pp.5-
9). The report finds numerous ways through which the Chinese are, allegedly, developing such 
political influence, among which  ‘putting dissenting governments into the freezer, turning 
European media into instruments of fostering friendship by promoting media cooperation 
agreements, deploying European pro-China lobbyists to boost Chinese view on critical issues 
in EU-China relations’, however, what interests the framework of this research  is the section 
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regarding the construction of political influence via investments (Benner et al., 2018, pp.14-
16).  
 
The report presents a series of events that can be described as red lights, liking certain unusual 
behaviours of member states at international level to the reception of Chinese investments 
(Benner et al., 2018, p.16). These events are considered to be linked to the direct leverage 
exercised by Chinese investments (Benner et al., 2018, p.16). Nevertheless, since the report 
seems to lack scientific proves in support of the claim that China is directly exercising political 
influence in the EU and creating disruption among its member states, such claim will not be 
supported in this research paper and the idea of a Chinese will behind the potential negative 
impact of the FDIs on the integration process will be put aside.  
 
Finally, the EPRS, the research centre internal to the European Parliament, has produced a 
document which explains and follows the procedure of the proposal regarding the EU 
framework for FDIs screening (EPRS, 2018). In the document all the steps that such proposal 
needs to go through before being implemented are explained. However, the most relevant token 
of information that can be extracted from the document is that, in European Parliament, one of 
the most vocal member states against the proposed framework is not Greece, Hungary or Czech 
Republic, nor Denmark or The Netherlands (Seaman et al., 2017, pp.13-14), but the UK (EPRS, 
2018). The UK who in 2016 voted to leave the EU (“EU Referendum Results,” 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, the EPRS report, further helps us understanding that FDIs in general and Chinese 
FDI in particular, as the potential trigger of the Commission proposal (Van Der Putten, 2018), 
constitute a sensitive issue for the member states and probable cause of disruption.  
 
In conclusion, various sources and types of literature have been provided in this section showing 
that the research on the relationship between China and the EU has been at the centre of the 
attention for years now. However, the focus on the role Chinese investments play in the 
integration process of the EU has been explored only by a few academics and only partially in 
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the think tank world, presenting conflicting positions and only seldom solid scientific proves in 
support of one’s argument. Moreover, no relevant literature was found on the way FDIs impact 
regional integration, which might explain why so little was found on the relation between 
Chinese investments and the EU integration. This is why this research aims at furthering the 
work done so far and focus specifically on assessing whether and under which circumstances 
Chinese investments can have a negative impact on the European integration.  
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Chapter III. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
3.1 Intergovernmentalism  
Intergovernmentalism is one of the most important theories on European Integration, Stanley 
Hoffman is its father (Hoffmann, 1995). He argues that the EU is the result of harmonizing 
national interests. Thus, the degree of integration is stronger when the interests of the members 
coincide, while is weaker or fractured when they do not (Hoffmann, 1995). This would explain 
why in certain historical periods the level of integration was stronger, as it was driven by 
coinciding interests, while other periods where signed by disruption, which was caused by 
diverging domestic interests. If we assume that economic prosperity is one of the main concerns 
of a nation and thus, one of its main interests, then, the means through which such aim is reached 
becomes relevant for a government.  
 
According to a different branch of theory focusing on European Integration called neo-
functionalism, the political integration of European countries was a consequence of a spillover 
effect. EU countries first integrated economically and since that brought to a prosperous 
economy and positive outcomes then, through spillover, countries began to integrate also at 
political level (Haas, 1958). However, if the line of thought of the spillover effect was to be 
followed and spillover was indeed an inevitable/natural process, as advocated by the neo-
functionalists, other regional organizations such as ASEAN would have witnessed the same 
process of the EU; economic integration naturally conducting to political integration. 
Nevertheless, ASEAN is an example of regional organisations whose integration is almost 
entirely economic and not political, as it is not in the objectives of the organisation to be a 
politically integrated regional union (ASEAN, 2018). Thus, the argument brought forward by 
the neo-functionalists of a natural spillover effect will not be used in this research paper, as 
economic integration seems not to naturally lead to political integration.  
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Following the above developed reasoning, the success of the EU, economically and politically, 
satisfied and matched the interests of its member states allowing them to reach economic 
prosperity, at different degrees (European Commission, 2017). According to both theories, the 
economic power of the EU can be considered the driving force of the organisation which for 
years has allowed it to propagate an economic and political agenda within and without its 
territory; including the spreading of values such as democracy, respect for human rights and 
rule of law (Tuomioja, 2009). 
 
 However, such economic power has received a set back and so has the ability of the EU to 
meet the interests of its member states. China, on the other hand, in the past years, has been 
fuelling its economic power abroad, meeting the interests of many countries worldwide, 
including European ones (Rhodium Group, 2018). Thus, as far as the ability to meet member 
states’ interests is concerned, the EU and China can be comparable. It must be said, however, 
that at the current state, the economic power of the EU still meets the interests of members 
states more than China, nevertheless, China seems to have more will and ability than the EU in 
exponentially increasing its economic power in the region in the future (European Commission, 
2017)(Seaman et al., 2017, pp.9-14). 
 
Thus, this research paper will build on intergovernmentalism, as overarching theory to explain 
the phenomenon studied, hence, considering the interests of the member states as the main 
driving force behind integration and thus, also disintegration. Nevertheless, rather than a shift 
in the interests of the member states, this paper argues that while the main interests remain the 
same, in this case economic prosperity, the means through which countries achieve them change 
and the two means here analysed are the EU and China. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis 
The facts described in Chapter I and the arguments and theories presented in Chapter II and III, 
seem to suggest that Chinese investments have some sort of impact on the integration process 
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of the EU. In detail, such impact appears to be negative rather than positive; pushing towards 
division rather than integration.  
Following this line of reasoning, the main hypothesis (H1) claims that Chinese investments in 
the member states have a negative impact on the EU integration process when such investments 
match the interests of the member states.  
Such claim will be supported if the following elements are present:  
1- Presence of Chinese investments in member states 
2-  A connection is found between Chinese investments and the country’s interests 
3- A perceivable change in the behaviour of member states at EU level is witnessed 
 
Following this line of reasoning the main hypothesis would be rejected if after the injection of 
Chinese investments, which have then been assessed to be significant for the national interests, 
there has been no particular change in the member states’ behaviour towards Brussels. In 
particular, there was no episode or situation in which the member states have taken a pro-China 
position in opposition to their usual behaviour and impeding the EU to act as a unified actor. 
However, if this paper fails to show the significance of Chinese investments for the country’s 
interests, the main hypothesis should also in that case be considered rejected. 
 
Although the main hypothesis supports the claim of the negative impact of Chinese investments 
on the integration process, it must be briefly acknowledged that Chinese investments may also 
have a positive impact on the integration process and that it might be interesting to explore such 
impact as well in the future. Investments can potentially decrease the economic gap between 
economically weaker and stronger member states by empowering weaker economies and have 
the ability of alleviating the weight of the crisis in the region (Varoufakis, 2017, pp.313-321).  
3.2.1 Conceptualization of variables  
Chinese Investments is the independent variable or explanatory variable. By investments it is 
mainly meant the inflows of Chinese capital in form of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into 
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the member states of the European Union. However, not to exclude any relevant information, 
the more general inflow of capital coming from the Chinese government and Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) will eventually also be considered. The definition of FDIs provided 
by the OECD will be adopted; ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows record the value of cross-
border transactions related to direct investment during a given period of time […]. Financial 
flows consist of equity transactions, reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt 
transactions. […] Inward flows represent transactions that increase the investment that foreign 
investors have in enterprises resident in the reporting economy less transactions that decrease 
the investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises. FDI flows are measured in USD and 
as a share of GDP. FDI creates stable and long-lasting links between economies’ (OECD, 2018).  
 
The European integration process, hence, the dependent variable, is a “[...] process of 
overcoming barriers that divide neighbouring countries [...]. Essentially, it is a process by which 
groups of countries liberalize trade, creating a common market for goods, people, capital and 
services. The European Union advocates regional integration as an effective means of achieving 
prosperity, peace and security” (European Commission, 2018). Although this is the official 
definition of European integration process that can be found on the website of the European 
Commission, it lacks to include the political dimension of integration, which is fundamental 
(Nicoll & Salmon, 1994). In fact, part of the integration process consists of the cession by the 
member states of part of their sovereignty to Brussels, allowing for deeper cohesion and a 
stronger union (Nicoll & Salmon, 1994). 
 
The concept of Interest covers a role of particular importance as it is at the core of the theoretical 
framework adopted. ‘There is no single, overarching conception of what constitutes the national 
interests or what should be considered as national interests’, however it is ‘a concept that 
enables national [..] policymakers to articulate what matters to the country and how a nation 
should set its priorities. National interests are enduring, such as protecting the integrity of the 
state and promoting economic prosperity’ (Reveron & Gvosdev, 2018). Economic prosperity 
is a key concept as it appears to be one of the fundamental aspects composing a country’s 
national interest, thus, when this research will address (national) interest, it will be referring to 
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this particular aspect, unless explicitly specified otherwise. The means through which such 
interest (economic prosperity) is achieved are as important as the interest itself. 
 
For sake of clarity, the term circumstances will be better defined. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, circumstance is ‘a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action’ 
and it adds ‘an event or fact that causes or helps to cause something to happen, […]’ 
(“Circumstance,” 2018). In research, it is difficult to explicitly talk about causality as direct 
causality is difficult to a- find and b- prove, thus, this research will deem as valid the terms 
‘connected with or relevant to’, and eventually ‘helps to cause’, as these more general relations 
allow for more flexibility. Nevertheless, as in the definition offered, when discussing 
circumstances, we will be looking for ‘facts or conditions’. 
 
3.2.2 Operationalisation of variables  
Chinese investments will be measured using data collected through secondary sources, in 
particular from data published by the Rhodium Group, but also from reports published by 
MERICS and ETNC. The adopted time-line will be of eleven years, from 2006 to 2017. The 
selection of the timeline was driven by two main factors; firstly, it includes two different 
Chinese administrations, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, secondly, it includes years pre-, during and 
-post the economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008. However, it is not required to have more than 
a couple of years before the crisis, as the amount of investments from China during the years 
of Hu Jintao administration was not significant (Rhodium Group, 2018). However, since the 
presence of Chinese FDIs is not the only aspect of Chinese FDIs that will be analysed, the 
response given by the population to these investments and the significance they cover for the 
receiving economy thus, for the interests of such country, will also be looked at. The response 
will be assessed by looking at data available regarding the popularity of China in the member 
states retrievable from the Eurobarometer (2017) and surveys conducted by Pew Research 
Center (2014). The significance of the investments will be evaluated by looking at the (a) 
amount, (b) impact on GDP, (c) receiving sectors, (d) timing and (d) future potential of Chinese 
investments. These criteria have been established by looking at the literature regarding the 
importance of foreign investments for the development and growth of a country (Tsitouras, 
2016).The sources used to obtain information on such criteria will be the ones mentioned above 
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plus documents from national banks (Santander Trade Portal, 2017) (Santander Trade Portal, 
2017) and state documents (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People Republic of China, 
2016). All the data regarding investments will be presented and measured in flow. 
 
To assess the degree of the EU integration process, the main criterion that will be taken into 
account is the ability of the member states to speak with one voice and act as a unified actor, 
levelling differences rather than raising them, in matters regarding China. To measure the 
dependent variable, the research will look at the general voting patterns and behaviours at EU 
level of member states, assessing whether there has been a change in the way countries voted 
or expressed their opinion in the time-line adopted. Such data can be retrieved from the portal 
of the European Parliament and the Council gathering the votes expressed by countries’ 
representative through the years (European Parliamen, 2018) (Consilium Europa, 2018). 
However, since the number of official votes in China-related matters are limited both at EU and 
UN level, general episodes of disruption at debate and drafting level will be considered. Such 
information will be retrieved from news journals such as Politico and the content of several 
reports produced by MERICS and ETNC. Moreover, currently, in Brussels, the Parliament is 
discussing whether to approve the creation of a centralized screening mechanism for Foreign 
Direct Investments. The result of such debate and the voting of the member states will be 
relevant to further assess whether the EU is capable of acting as one united entity in China-
related matters (EPRS, 2018). In addition, the history of the case studies in the EU and the 
public opinion regarding the EU will be used as criteria to assess the degree of EU integration 
in the countries. These data will be retrieved from the official website of the Commission on 
member states (European Commission, 2018) and from researches perpetrated by Pew Research 
Center (2017). 
 
It was previously said that the aspect of Interest that this research focuses on is economic 
prosperity; a status in which a country witnesses high levels of consistent growth allowing it to 
provide its population with wealth and wellness (The Econmist, 2016). Nevertheless, it was 
also stressed how the means through which such aim is achieved are as important as the aim 
itself. To understand which means a country can use to better achieve its interests, the starting 
point of such country needs to be assessed using the following criteria: 
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1- Type of economy (importers/exporters) 
2- Economic condition (GDP) 
3- Sectors important for the economy 
The type of economy a country possess needs to be assessed, as it already clarifies the direction 
a country has to take to achieve its interests. The classification suggested by Meunier (2014) 
will be adopted dividing European countries in import-oriented (‘importers’) and export-
oriented (‘exporters’) economies. Such information will be retrieved from The Observatory of 
Economic Complexity (2018). Then, the condition of the economy in the selected time span 
needs to be addressed and measured; by looking at the GDP, the size of the economy will be 
assessed, whether a country has weak or strong economy, and whether such economy is large 
or small. By looking at the data made available by Eurostat (2018), an economy can be 
considered to be strong and large if it has an annual GDP of at least $500 billion, which is 
approximately the European average (Eurostat, 2018). Finally, the sectors important for the 
country, hence, those that contribute the most to its GDP, will be looked at. This information 
will be obtained from The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2018), from academic articles 
and web pages dedicated to the economic analysis of countries’ economies. 
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Chapter IV. Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Most-similar systems design and case studies 
The methodology selected for the analysis of the studied phenomenon is the most-similar 
systems design (MSSD) (Lijphart, 1971, pp.682-693). The most-similar systems design is a 
qualitative method of analysis which tries to compensate for problems that other comparison-
based methodologies, such as the method of agreement or the method of difference, present. 
The main obstacles faced by the other comparison-based methods, in fact, are the presence of 
too many variables to consider and too few cases to analyse (Collier, 1993, pp.105-119). The 
MSSD  requires the researcher to purposely select cases that are as similar as possible to one 
another, overcoming the problem related to the number of variables. The commonalities shared 
by the cases selected are kept constant, allowing the researcher to narrow down the focus of 
his/her attention on differences (Collier, 1993, pp.105-119). Likewise, the problem of the little 
number of cases, can be faced by doing an across-time study, however, if one decides to proceed 
this way, the time division needs to be justified (Collier, 1993, pp.105-119). In the section 
dedicated to variables a precise time-line has been selected and justified.  
 
After June 2017, a lot of interest and speculation has appeared regarding the potential political 
influence China was able to exercise over Greece. Although Greece received a lot of attention, 
the explanation furnished for the phenomenon were very rarely based on scientific analysis. 
Thus, this research aims at providing a scientific analysis of a phenomenon which was already 
very much speculated on. For reason of feasibility the focus has been narrowed to the influence 
of Chinese investments on the European integration process. Thus, Greece was selected as a 
case study for this research, however, to better test the phenomenon, a term of comparison for 
Greece seemed a good way to obtain more reliable information and results, thus, the decision 
to adopt the most-similar system design. Moreover, the selection of a case study to compare 
Greece with, will allow us not only to establish whether Chinese investments have a negative 
impact, but also under which circumstances. A European country that shares many points of 
contact with Greece is Italy, which is also a case that has not received much attention in the 
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framework of the impact of Chinese FDIs, thus important playing factors might also be 
discovered by this comparison. 
 
Italy belongs to the same geographical area of Greece, thus, allowing to control for variables 
such as cultural and historical background, and geopolitical position. Other commonalities 
shared by the cases selected for this research are the severe impact of the crisis on the national 
economy, slow growth, high debt, corruption, high levels of underwater economy, imposition 
of prolonged austerity measures and others that will be later presented (Blyth, 2013, pp.62-71). 
The more commonalities are shared by the selected cases, the more variables will be controlled 
for. Even though the problem of too many variables is softened by the selection of the most-
similar systems design, it remains nor possible nor necessary to control for any existing variable, 
thus, the research and the process that led to the cases selection focuses only on those aspects 
that are considered to be the most relevant in relation to the studied phenomenon.  
 
4.2 Data Collection  
The data necessary to proceed with the research will be mainly collected using secondary 
sources. The amount of Chinese FDIs in Europe, and in the specific case studies, will be taken 
from the Rhodium Group EU-China FDI Monitor (Rhodium Group, 2018) and the report 
published in 2017 by ETNC (Seaman et al., 2017). However, for more country-specific 
information regarding Chinese FDIs, the information furnished by the ETNC report will be 
supported by further material; for Greece reports from the Institute of International Economic 
Relations will be used (Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017), while data for Italy will be retrieved from 
Il Sole 24 Ore (Infodata, 2017). As previously mentioned, information related to other aspects 
of FDIs, and not only, will also be retrieved from the Pew Research Center, the Eurobarometer, 
Eurostat, national banks and state document. 
 
Data useful to assess the level of EU integration, hence, episodes in which EU countries have 
spoken in favour of China and against the rest of the member states or against the central 
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position of Brussels will be retrieved from a report by MERICS (Benner et al., 2018) and from 
news articles (Cerulus & Hanke, 2018). While information regarding the history and public 
opinion towards the EU will be taken from the website of the European Commission and the 
Pew Research Center. 
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Chapter V. Case studies and Analysis 
 
5.1 Cultural and Historical Background 
As shown by the map below (fig.3), geographically, both Greece and Italy are in Southern 
Europe. They are both located on peninsulas, hence, most of their borders are delimited by the 
Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, through history, the Mediterranean Sea had constituted one 
of the most important resources for both the civilisations (Abulafia, 2013); the access to the 
Mediterranean Sea is also one of the most relevant motives of interest for Chinese investors, 
also in light of the Belt and Road Initiative (see fig.1) (Seaman at el., 2017).  
Figure 3. The Mediterranean Sea 
 
(Source: Google Maps retrieved at https://www.google.com/maps/@53.8908186,2.5260073,3z  on 10/05/2018)  
Looking at the map presented in fig.2, it can be seen how close Greece and Italy are to one 
another, furnishing a first explanation for the high degree of shared historical and cultural 
background. 
 
Since ancient times, the two countries have been in close contact to one another sharing history, 
culture and also territories (Bettalli et al., 2015) (Livio, 2005). For example, between the VIII 
and VII centuries before Christ, regions in Southern Italy, such as Campagna, Puglia, Basilicata, 
Calabria and Sicily, were called by the Romans Magna Graecia, because of the density of 
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people from Greece living there (Ciaceri, 1932). Up to these days, it is possible to see and 
admire the architectural and artistic remaining left in Southern Italy by the ancient Greek 
populations. In the same way, later on, Greece became part of the Roman Empire, receiving the 
influence of the Roman culture (Bettalli et al., 2015).  
 
Although in different modalities, both Greece and Italy experienced dictatorships and civil wars 
(Merriman, 2005) (Veremis & Koliopulos, 2014). Both have been governed by dictators; 
Metaxas in Greece and Mussolini in Italy, however, the two countries entered the Second World 
Conflict as enemies (Montanelli, 1965) (Veremis & Koliopulos, 2014).  
 
After World War II, both countries, as the majority of the other Western European countries, 
saw a relevant economic growth and democracies were established (Merriman, 2005). 
Nevertheless, in 1967, a coup d’état led by the military took place in Greece and the country 
will have to wait until 1974, after the death of dictator Georgios Papadopoulos, to see 
democracy and freedom re-established (Veremis & Koliopulos, 2014).  
 
After this brief historical digression which was aimed at giving a general overview of the shared 
past of the case studies, now the focus of the analysis of similarities and differences between 
the case studies will be moved to the main variables. 
 
5.2 Interest 
As it was previously noted, economic prosperity is the part of national interests this research 
will be looking at.  Achieving economic prosperity is in the interest of both Greece and Italy, 
nevertheless, the ways in which the two countries achieve such objective are different, as the 
overall type and the condition of the two economies presents important differences. The criteria 
(type of economy and economic condition) identified to assess interests and the means to reach 
it will be used to present the situation of each case study. For the sake of the reasoning there 
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expressed, instead of dedicating a separate section to the sectors important for the economy, 
these will be embedded in the presentation and analysis of the type of economy.  
 
5.2.1 Type of economy (importers/exporters) 
Greece is a country that heavily relies on imports and produces very little exports (Blyth, 2013). 
Greek imports almost double its exports (OEC, 2018), hence, following Meunier (2014) 
characterisation of EU economies, Greece can be listed among the ‘importers’. Italy, on the 
contrary possesses an economy which almost equally relies on both exports and imports, with 
the former being slightly larger than the latter (OEC, 2018). Thus, Italy falls under the category 
of ‘exporters’(Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2018). 
 
The economy of ‘importers’ rely more on foreign capital and products than the one of 
‘exporters’. Thus, ‘importers’ (Greece) are more subjected to and dependent on external 
influences than ‘exporters’ (Italy). In the case of Italy and Greece, the economy of the former 
is more variegated, as it functions thanks to a combination of diverse sources, such as 
production, import and export of goods, services and capital (OEC, 2018); while the latter has 
more limited options, for example, it cannot rely as much neither on production nor on exports. 
Hence, in case of whatsoever economic crisis ‘importers’ are theoretically internally less well 
equipped than ‘exporters’, as they have less options, in terms of sources of wealth, to be used 
to recover (Tsitouras, 2016).  
 
The sectors of the Greek economy that contribute the most to its GDP are tourism, the shipping 
industry and agricultural products (Dimitriadou, 2017). Italian GDP is mainly composed by 
services (inclusive of tourism) and the manufacturing industry (“Italy Economic Outlook,” 
2018). Particularly relevant is the space occupied by the manufacturing sector, which as it can 
be seen on fig.4 occupies a significant percentage of the country’s GDP  (World Bank data, 
2018).  
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Figure 4. Impact of manufacturing sector on GDP 
 
(Source: World Bank data. Retrieved at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?end=2016&locations=IT-
GR&start=2006 on 07/05/2018) 
 
Greece’s most important importing partners in 2016 were Germany (11%), Italy (8.3%), Russia 
(6.6%), China (6.7%) and Iraq (5.5%) (OEC, 2018). Italian most relevant importers in 2016 
were Germany (16%), France (9%), China (7.5%), The Netherlands (5.6%) and Spain (5.4%) 
(OEC, 2018). As it can be seen, China is among the top importing partners for both countries. 
Looking at how the major importers have changed from 2006 to 2016, while Italy has been 
increasingly relying on European countries as sources of imports (from 66% in 2006 to 69% in 
2016), Greece has been decreasing the amount of imports originating for European countries 
(from 66% in 2006 to 62% in 2016), an example of this would be the progressive loss of 
relevance of France as source of imports for Greece, while the European country remains a 
stable origin of imports for Italy (OEC, 2018).  
 
5.2.2 Economic condition (GDP) 
The Italian economy is stronger and larger than the Greek one, with $1,859,383.61 millions of 
GDP in 2016, against the $192,690.81 millions of GDP of Greece (World Bank data, 2018). 
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Figure 5. GDPs 2006-2016 
 
(Source: World Bank data. Retrieved at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&locations=IT-
GR&start=2006 on 07/05/2018) 
 
Italy is the fourth largest contributor to the economy of the EU, while Greece only occupies the 
fifteenth place (Eurostat, 2016). In 2008, an extremely severe financial and economic crisis hit 
Europe; some countries were better equipped than others to respond to it. Greece and Italy, 
together with Ireland, Portugal and Spain, were among those that were less well equipped and 
thus, more damaged by it (Blyth, 2013, p.67). Due to economic reasons and apparatus that were 
in place before the crisis, Greece and Italy suffered an extremely stark recession from which 
they have been starting to slowly recover after ten years (Economia, 2018) (Wallace, 2017). 
Both countries had a significant sovereign debt before the crisis hit them, however, while in 
Greece this was the result of slow economy, imports largely surpassing exports, growing deficit 
and structural problems (Blyth, 2013, pp.62-71), in Italy it was the result of a combination of 
‘low-growth, old age, low productivity and institutional sclerosis’ (Blyth, 2013, pp.62-71). If 
to this we add other characteristics shared by the two, such as high level of corruption, opaque 
economy, difficult tax systems characterized by tax evasion and an unclear administration of 
public money, we have the description of the Greek and Italian situation pre-crisis and at the 
same time, the recipe for disaster (Blyth, 2013, pp.62-71). Moreover, to ‘save’ the two countries, 
severe austerity measures were ‘imposed’ on their populations which ended up further 
exacerbating their struggles for years (Blyth, 2013, pp.71-81). 
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We have briefly seen how the crisis and the consequent austerity measures have hit both 
countries heavily, however, the impact of these phenomena was different for the two economies. 
In both cases it was severe and both cases were badly equipped to receive them; nevertheless, 
Italy’s economy was still stronger and larger than the Greek one (Eurostat, 2016). Thus, even 
though crisis and austerity hit both countries hard, the Italian economy was, and still is, in better 
shape than the Greek one (World Bank data, 2018). After all, the consequences of the economic 
crisis and of the introduction of the austerity measures in Greece were at the centre of the 
European debate for months as the country was on the edge of failure (Hewitt, 2015). Italy is 
yet to find itself in such tragic circumstances.  
 
Because the two economies have different settings (see section 5.2.1) and because their 
economic conditions are also different, they have different starting points, thus, the means 
adopted to achieve economic prosperity differ as well. Being an ‘importer’, Greece relies more 
on external capital and goods than Italy, ‘exporter’; consequently, a decrease in the amount of 
inbound foreign capital or goods would be much more harmful for Greece than for Italy. The 
crisis of 2008 created a situation in which Greece lacked the capital to make its own country 
work, as it could no longer afford to import the necessary amount of products to sustain the 
economy, it struggled in attracting the necessary investments and goods, and the available 
inbound capital was no longer sufficient (Freeman, 2015). Traditional European partners, which 
the country had been relying on, were not willing or able to repair to hole left by the economic 
crisis (Blyth, 2014, p.71), leaving Greece with little alternative than looking for other capital 
provider in order to guarantee its import-relying economy to keep working (Varoufakis, 2017, 
pp.313-321). 
 
Moreover, after the 2015 debate between Greece and the Troika on further austerity measures, 
option that the Greek government and its people were not willing to accept (Arnett et al., 2015), 
Greece was not only forced to look for alternative capital, but it was also willing to do so, in 
order to weaken the grasp that the EU, some member states more than others, had on it and gain 
bargaining power vis à vis the organisation (Varoufakis, 2017, pp.313-321). Thus, it was in the 
interest of Greece to find new important economic partners and China provided the solution. 
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Italy, on the other hand, having a stronger and larger economy, had and still has, in theory, more 
options to recover and boost its growth, such as increase internal production, increase exports, 
attract more investments, both in terms of amount and number of providers, and so forth 
(Costelloe & Totaro, 2017).  
 
In conclusion, as far the interest of the nation is concerned and thus, economic prosperity, Italy 
seems to have more options and flexibility than Greece in selecting the ways to achieve it, even 
in times of crisis. Although foreign capital covers a relevant place in both economies (see 
section 5.3), the ability of Italy to diversify the sources that contribute to its economy allows it 
to rely on more means to make its economy work and permits it to have a series of alternatives 
in case of loss of foreign contribution thus, perceiving the potential decrease of inbound capital 
and goods less severely. Greece does not have such luxury, being its trade balance negative, 
imports are vital for the survival of the country’s economy and even more in times of crisis, its 
survival depends on its ability to grant the inflow of foreign products and capital into the country. 
Hence, if traditional sources of products and capital are no longer sufficient, for a country such 
as Greece, looking for alternative sources is first of all a matter of survival, which also might 
mean being ready to do everything possible, and more, to grant the continuous flow such capital 
into the country.  
 
So far, we have talked about export and import of goods and capital, which entail a broad series 
of things among which loans, aid, trade agreement and trade of goods and services; however, 
the focus of the research paper is on Foreign Direct Investments, which are a particular type of 
inbound capital (see section 3.2.1) which creates a long-lasting economic relation between the 
countries involved (OECD, 2018). From a certain point of view, just looking at FDIs can be 
seen as reductive, however, due to the difficulty in obtaining data on the matter, in particular 
when China is involved, and due to the constraints in time and space this paper was subjected 
to, the choice of limiting the research to the impact of FDIs allows for a more thorough, even 
if less broad, analysis.  
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5.3 Foreign Direct Investments 
 
Because of the different size of the economies and how these are structured, the degree to which 
Greece and Italy rely on external investments is different. For example, fig.6 shows what was 
the impact of FDIs on the two GDPs in 2016. As it can be seen the impact FDIs had on the 
Greek economy is 0.4% higher than in the Italian one, which, taking into account we are looking 
at GDPs, is considered to be a relevant percentage. 
 
Figure 6. FDI flows, Inward, % of GDP, 2016 
 
(Source: OECD data. Retrieved at https://data.oecd.org/chart/5aiv on 12/05/2018)  
 
 
Furthermore, fig.7 shows that until 2013, the amount of FDIs received by Greece were lower 
than the amount received by Italy, exception made for 2012 year for which no data have been 
found for Italy. However, after 2013, Greece has started to receive more FDIs than Italy, 
exception made for 2015. Fig.7 in particular shows that from 2016 to 2017, FDIs in Greece 
have gained 0.4%, while in Italy they have lost 0.32%. Although one year does not represent a 
steady trend, it can be an early warning sign, suggesting us to keep our eyes open for future 
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changes in the amount of FDIs and in particular, the impact these have on national GDPs. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that these data show the impact on GDP of all inbound FDIs. 
 
Figure 7. FDI flows, Inward, % of GDP, 2006-2017 
 
(Source: OECD data. Retrieved at https://data.oecd.org/chart/5aiu on 12/05/2018) 
 
 
Although Greece depends more on foreign capital than Italy, Italy has been able to attract 
foreign investments coming for a diverse number of countries both within and without Europe 
(Infodata, 2017), while Greece has been struggling in attracting significant foreign investments 
in the country (Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017). Nevertheless, the data showed in fig.7 suggest an 
improvement by Greece in the ability to attract FDIs. 
 
The main receiving sectors of FDIs in Italy are Information and Communication (39%), Finance 
and Insurance (27%), Real estate (7%), Manufacturing (6%), Administration activities (5%), 
Trade and Maintenance (5%), and Transport and Storage (4%) (Santander Trade Portal, 2017). 
In Greece are Trade (22.6%), Information and Communication (16.4%), Refined petroleum, 
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Chemical, Pharmaceutics and Plastic products (11.9%), Electricity, gas and water (11.9%) and 
Real estate (9.4%) (Santander Trade Portal, 2017)1. 
 
These data allow us to notice two main differences; first, the sectors that receive FDIs are 
different in the two countries, confirming that the two have different economies, and different 
ways to achieve their interests. One could argue that electricity, gas and water appear to be 
more vital for the survival of a country than finance and insurance. Second, the percentages of 
FDIs in Italy are spread through more sectors, while in Greece they are more concentrated in 
fewer sectors.   
 
In 2016, the top countries of origin of FDIs directed to Greece were The Netherlands (22.6%), 
Luxemburg (21.6%), Germany (20.7%), France (8.6%) and Switzerland (6.8%) (Bank of 
Greece,  2017). In Italy were France (37,8%), the UK (19,4%), Germany (15,6%), the US 
(5,7%) and Spain (2,6%) (Banca d'Italia, 2017). Thus, in 2016 European countries still 
dominated the list of top FDIs origin directed to both countries.  
 
5.4 Chinese Foreign Direct Investments 
 
As the data just furnished show, China is not among the top investors, in terms of FDIs, neither 
in Greece nor in Italy. Chinese investments cover a special role, as independent variable of the 
main hypothesis and they deserve special attention as their amount is increasing in almost all 
EU countries (Seamen et al., 2017).  
 
In 2016, Italy has received 1,109 million euros (approx. $1,230.99 million 2 ) of Chinese 
investments, while Greece only 346.3 million euros (approx. $381.06 million) (Seaman et al., 
2017, pp.70-82). For reference, the previous year, 2015, Chinese FDIs in Italy reached the 
amount of 7,527 million euros (approx. $8,354.97 million) thanks to the major acquisition by 
ChemChina of Pirelli (Seamant et al. 2017, pp.70-82). In the same year, 2015, the amount of 
                                                           
1 Data from 2016. 
2 Average of 2016 EUR-USD exchange rate; 1.11 (“US dollar (USD),” 2018) 
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Chinese investments in Greece was much lower than in 2016, 50.5 million euros (approx. 
$56.06 million) (Seaman et al., 2017, p.70). However, there are sources (Tonchev & Davarinou, 
2017) claiming that Chinese investments in Greece might be way higher the one estimated, for 
example, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) assesses that between 2005 and 2017, Greece 
has received more than $6 billion in investments from China (Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017). 
 
Italy seems to be receiving larger amounts of Chinese FDIs than Greece. However, the GDPs 
of the two countries differ. In 2016, the Greek GDP was of approx. $192,690.81 million  (World 
Bank data, 2018), while the Italian GDP in the same year was approx. $1,859,383.61 million 
(World Bank data, 2018). Thus, the impact of such investments on the GDPs is different, 
according to our calculation, in 2016, the impact of Chinese FDIs on the Italian GDP was 
approx. 0.07% and on the Greek GDP, approx. 0.19%. Although in both cases the impact was 
not particularly large, it was still larger in Greece than Italy. However, if we look at 2015 
instead, the impact on the Italian GDP was approx. 0.40% and on the Greek one 0.03%, hence 
being much larger on the former. Thus, it must be concluded that China is still a relatively small 
investor in both Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, while Chinese investments in Greece keep 
increasing, some sources show data according to which in Italy in 2016 they have decreased of 
1% from 2015, and of 39% if Hong Kong is included (Infodata, 2017). However, bear in mind 
that 2015 was the year of the acquisition of Pirelli and that 2016 is a particularly relevant year 
for the relationship between Greece and China, as it will be better shown later. For Italy, China 
represents an important economic partner and investor but one of the many as Italy has proven 
to be able to attract other important partners and investors (Infodata, 2017); for Greece ,whose 
ability which Greece has been struggling with attracting investments, mainly after the crisis, 
China is much more important source of capital (Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017).  
 
Both in Greece and Italy, China has been investing in sectors important for their economies and 
that at the same time are strategic for China itself. In Greece Chinese capital is invested in 
Tourism, Transports and Infrastructure, Energy, Telecommunications and Real Estate 
(Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017). In Italy, China is investing in Transports, the Auto industry, the 
Banking sector and in Technology (Seaman et al., 2017, pp.81-82). Both Greece and Italy have 
been the destination of investments liked to major projects; the acquisition of Pirelli in Italy, by 
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the SOE ChemChina, for 7 billion euros (approx. $7.7 million3), in 2015, and of the Piraeus 
Port in Greece, by the SOE COSCO, for 280.5 million euros (approx. $311.4 million) in 2016.  
 
Nevertheless, the way in which China, its products and its capital are perceived in Greece and 
in Italy is different. Since we are looking at democracies embedded in a globalised capitalistic 
system, public opinion is a relevant variable to be taken into account during the decision-
making process both at public and private level. Whether people like/approve an entity, a 
proposal or a line of action is relevant for its future success or failure. If the public disapproves 
such entity, proposal or line of action, it will be more likely to fail, on the contrary if the public 
approves it, the chances of success are higher. 
 
A 2014 report from the Pew Research Centre shows that the majority (52%) of the Greek 
population has a positive view of China and only a quite small portion (30%) sees it as negative; 
however, Italians have a relevant unbalance to the negative side (70%), while only a small 
percentage perceives China as positive (26%) (Pew Research Center, 2014). However, the 
Eurobarometer show shows that in 2017, the situation has slightly changed. While Italy more 
or less preserves its negative opinion towards China (60%), Greece has witnessed a decrease in 
support for the Asian power (45%) and a consequent increase in negative opinions (49%), 
showing a divided population (Eurobarometer, 2017). 
 
5.5 European Integration 
In this section, the level of EU integration in Greece and in Italy will be assessed looking at the 
history of the two countries in the organisation, at the public opinion towards the EU and at the 
behaviour, including voting behaviour, of the two countries in the framework of the EU. 
Both, Greece and Italy, are member of the EU. However, their history in the organisation is 
different; Italy is a founding member of the EU (European Commission, 2018) and it was 
already part of the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS), the predecessor of the EU. 
Thus, one could say that since 1951, Italy has been working proactively for a more united 
                                                           
3 The exchange rate EUR-USD used here was the one of 2016, as for the other exchanges. 
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Europe, nourishing the European project. Greece, on the other hand, joined the EU thirty years 
later, in 1981 (European Commission, 2018), after the fall of the military regime and re-
establishment of a democratic system. Both are members of the Eurozone, the monetary union 
of the EU that requires member states to give up their national currencies and adopt the Euro 
as single currency (European Commission, 2018), both are part of the Schengen Area 
(European Commission, 2000) and of the Single Market, which aims at overcoming national 
borders to allow the full implementation of the four freedoms of movement for goods, services, 
capital and people (European Commission, 2018). 
Their history in the organisation is not the only existing difference between the two. As fig.8 
shows, between 2010 and 2017, the Greeks have shown a lower favourability vis à vis the EU 
than the Italians (Pew Research Center, 2017). In both, however, the post-crisis period inflicted 
a harsh hit on the EU reputation (Eurobarometer, 2006). Nevertheless, while the public opinion 
regarding the EU in Greece seems to be improving after years of negative results, in agreement 
with the overall European trend, in Italy it is worsening (Pew Research Center, 2017).  
Figure 8. Favourability of EU in member states, %, 2010-2017 
 
(Source: Pew Research Center. Retrieved at http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/post-brexit-europeans-more-favorable-
toward-eu/pg_2017-06-15-eu-brexit-00-00/ on 12/05/2018) 
 
If we look at fig.9, which focuses on the year 2017, we have a more detailed representation of 
the public opinion of European countries have of the EU (Pew Research Center, 2017). 
Although fig.8 shows a decrease in favourability of EU reputation in Italy, the percentage of 
population favourable to the EU (57%) is still much higher than in Greece (34%) (Pew Research 
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center, 2017). Remember, however, that although austerity measures were severe in both 
countries, Greece received a particularly harsh treatment from Brussels which was received 
very negatively by the population, as shown by the results of the  2015 referendum (Arnett et 
al., 2015). The echoes of such measures are probably mirrored in the low degree of popularity 
of the EU in Greece.  
 
Figure 9. Favourability of EU in member states, %, 2017 
 
(Source: Pew Research Center. Retrieved at http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/post-brexit-europeans-more-favorable-
toward-eu/pg_2017-06-15-eu-brexit-00-00/ on 12/05/2018) 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008,  a series of populist parties started to appear and gain 
increasing support in both countries; Syriza in Greece and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy 
(Barber, 2018). Nevertheless, while the Greek Syriza has always had a clear anti-austerity, and 
partially anti-EU, programme (Nardelli, 2015), the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle has so far shown 
a much less clear  agenda.  
 
In Greece, Syriza won the 2015 elections with 35% of votes (Nardelli, 2015), in Italy 
Movimento 5 Stelle, as single party, has won the 2018 election with 32% of votes. Nevertheless, 
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according to the Italian electoral system, such percentage is not sufficient to form a government 
on its own; M5S has to join forces with other political parties to govern (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2018). 
The same had to be done by Syriza following the elections in 2015, when it created a coalition 
government with other political forces (Nardelli, 2015). 
 
Yet, Italy has another populist party, Lega, which unlike M5S has a clear anti-austerity and 
anti-EU programme and it has obtained 17% of votes at the 2018 elections. Per se it is not a 
high percentage of votes, but if compared with the results of the previous elections (4%) in 
2013, the relevance of such 17% becomes clearer (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2018)(Il Sole 24 Ore, 2013). 
Understanding the reason(s) behind the success of populism in Greece and Italy would require 
at least an entire research project, thus, here, suffice to notice that populist parties with a more 
or less strong anti-EU agenda have gained relevant support from the population of both 
countries. 
 
If one looks at the dataset available on the website of both the Council of the EU and the 
European Council containing the results of votes which took place at Council level, one could 
see that Greece has very rarely expressed a vote that differs from the overall trend of the other 
EU countries (VoteWatch, 2018).The same reasoning can be applied to Italy, exception made 
for a few issues regarding food regulation, Italy has always voted in agreement with the rest of 
the EU (VoteWatch, 2018). Nevertheless, there is little or no information available on the 
debates that took place before the voting, thus it is very difficult to assess whether Greece or 
Italy has expressed any concerns or worked to change the text of any particular vote, exception 
made for some famous episodes that have caught the attention of the media (Benner et al., 2018). 
The debates and votes at the European Parliament level have been left out, since the political 
dimension of the institution makes the votes of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) 
of a certain country very different according to the political group they belong to.  
In other words, MEPs discretely decide whether to vote in accordance with their country 
position or with the line of the political family the belong to; being right-wing (EPP), leftist 
(S&D), liberal (ALDE) etc. The political nature of the Parliament decreases the relevance of 
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votes at EP level in assessing the voting behaviour of a country at international level, for such 
purpose votes at Council level are more reliable. 
 
Thus, if one were to assess the level of EU integration according to the aspects that have just 
been presented, it would conclude that, at formal level Greece and Italy are equally integrated, 
as they both generally vote in compliance with the EU position (VoteWatch, 2018). As far as 
the public opinion is concerned, Italy seems to be slightly more favourable to the EU than 
Greece, but if we consider elections results, the two seem to share the commonality of 
witnessing the success of populist (partially anti-EU) parties. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned 
in the introduction, in few occasions, starting from 2016, Greece behaved differently from the 
majority of the other EU countries. Such different behaviour in most cases was displayed at 
debate/drafting level rather than in the moment of the vote thus, it does not appear on the voting 
records available, but other sources such as newspapers, journals and reports can be used to 
identify such episodes (Benner et al., 2018, p.16). The episodes which will be presented and 
better looked at in section 5.7 are in number very few compared to the times in which Greece 
voted and behaved in accordance with the EU, but this research claims that numbers are not as 
relevant as contents. Actions have relevance in themselves for the message they convey and for 
the impact they have on the society. History teaches that a single action with a relevant impact 
can cause as much disruption as a thousand little actions. Thus, not the numbers, but the contents, 
as the resonance and the impact they have had, are important.  
 
5.6 Constants 
 
Before continuing with the analysis, a tab containing the point of similarities will be furnished. 
Such tab will offer to the reader an easy visualisation of the variables so far identified which 
will be treated as constants.  
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Table 1. Constant Variables 
Constant Variables Description 
Historical and Cultural background Common historical and cultural roots and 
developments (see section 5.1) 
Geographical position and conformation Located in Southern Europe. Peninsulas (see 
section 5.1) 
Geopolitical position Access to the Mediterranean Sea 
Corruption High levels of corruption an opacity (see 
section 5.2.2) 
Underwater economy Widespread underwater economy (see 
section 5.2.2) 
Pre-crisis unstable economy (see section 5.2.2) 
Severity of 2008 crisis (see section 5.2.2) 
Difficult recovery (from 2008 crisis) (see section 5.2.2) 
Austerity measures Their presence and the negative way they 
were received and perceived by the 
population (see section 5.2.2) 
Populist parties Their presence and the increasing support 
they have been receiving (see section 5.5) 
Euroscepticism Entails blaming the EU for the severe impact 
of the crisis on the population, for the 
harshness of austerity measures and a rising 
sentiment of a country being better off 
without the EU (see section 5.5) 
EU membership Both countries are members of the EU, 
Eurozone, Schengen and part of the Single 
Market (see section 5.5) 
 
 
Some of the variables described present an oversimplification of the phenomenon they 
represent; for example, although held constant, the researcher is aware that Greece reacted with 
more difficulty than Italy to the crisis and to the austerity measures (Blyth, 2013, pp.62-64). 
This said, these are considered to be small differences which have been taken into account, but 
the overall variables will still be treated as constants, since the degree of similarity remains 
high.  
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5.7 Chinese FDIs, EU integration and Interest 
 
In the previous part, the main variables have been presented and analysed separately in relation 
with the case studies, the next step of the analysis will try to look at the relation among the main 
variables in the case studies and it will proceed in the following way; first, the episodes in which 
Greece adopted a disruptive behaviour will be enlisted, then the level of EU Integration of both 
Greece and Italy will be assessed looking at periods pre- and post- 2016, then, a further 
consideration on the connection between FDIs and national interest will be made and finally, 
the relation between Chinese FDIs and behaviours related to EU integration will be addressed.  
 
According to the information offered and gathered so far, in the past, Greece has generally 
voted in compliance with the EU position and has rarely publicly voiced disagreeing positions. 
The same can be said about Italy. Nevertheless, while Italy kept behaving in compliance, 
starting from 2016, three episodes have been registered in which Greece has clearly expressed 
its dissent vis à vis the EU position on China-related matters.  
 
1- July 2016, Greece (and Hungary) obstructed a EU statement regarding the ruling of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on the South China Sea dispute, which 
established the illegality of China’s claims over the area, in particular the legitimacy of 
the nine-dash line (Ganan Almond, 2016). The issue was the wording of the statement; 
Greece desired for the statement not to contain any strong language and, most 
importantly, no direct mention of Beijing was to be made in it, not an easy task 
considering the dispute was between Beijing and Manila (Benner et al., 2018, p.16) 
(Reuters, 2016). The issuing of such statement turned into a particularly difficult task, 
showing the struggles of the EU to speak with one voice. In the end, a very soft and 
diplomatic declaration was issued (Consilium Europa, 2016). 
2- In June 2017, took place the (in)famous episode at the UN Human Rights Council. 
Greece vetoed a joint EU statement aimed at condemning the condition of human rights 
in the People Republic of China (Cerulus & Hanke, 2018). This signed the first time the 
EU failed to make a joint statement at the UNHRC, in the past it had never encountered 
such a problem, after all, the respect for human rights is among the founding values of 
the EU. This was probably the most surprising and disappointing episode of Greek 
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disagreement the EU had faced, followed by an intense proliferation on the media of the 
issue.  
3- In 2017, when the proposal for the central screening mechanism for foreign direct 
investments was advanced, a series of countries, among which Greece, for diverse 
reasons required for the wording of the statement announcing the proposal to be 
attenuated (Cerulus & Hanke, 2018). Although numerous reasons have been given for 
opposing the mechanism, from preserving the freedom of the members in deciding the 
origin and amount of their incoming investments to avoiding a scenario in which big 
European economies decide for everyone and smaller economies are left with little with 
little decisional power on the matter, the reason offered by the Greek government not to 
support the mechanism makes it particularly relevant for this research paper. Greece 
explicitly stated that the incoming FDIs from China are a reason to be against the 
centralised FDIs screening mechanism (Benner et al., 2018, p.16). However, it is still 
unknown what the result of the vote will be.  
 
To sum up, until 2016, both Greece and Italy generally behaved in accordance with the EU line, 
showing relatively high levels of EU integration, their representatives at international level were 
collaborative and contributed to the ability of the organisation to act as one entity. A similar 
level of EU integration would be the expected outcome, as the two share several common tracts 
from ancient history to contemporaneity such as the severity of the crisis and the raise of 
populist parties.  
 
Relatively to the similarities just mentioned, another relevant exception to the in-agreement-
with-the-EU behaviour that took place in the considered time-line are the debates and issues 
that followed the crisis and most importantly, the introduction of austerity measures in both 
countries. However, since they are characteristics present in both case studies, they are variables 
that have been controlled for (see section 5.5); including the debates and disagreement voiced 
at EU level by both (Smith, 2016) (Panorama, 2017).  
 
From 2016 onwards, Italy has kept displaying a high degree of integration, contributing to the 
ability of the organisation to speak with one voice and keep demolishing national barriers and 
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differences for a more integrated EU (EPRS, 2018). For example, Italy was one of the members, 
with France and Germany, to proactively propose the adoption of a EU centralised mechanism 
to screen inbound foreign investments for all the members; proposal which, we remind, was 
probably triggered by the increasing inflow of Chinese FDIs (Van Der Putten, 2018). 
 
However, starting from 2016, Greece began to voice its disagreement at EU level, as the points 
presented above show. Thus, the issue to explore is what pushed two very similar countries 
which had being behaving similarly to each other in the EU to suddenly take different positions? 
Or better what drove Greece’s change of behaviour? 
 
The mentioned episodes share a common characteristic, they all regard debates on China-
related issues. In July 2016, Alexis Tsipras conducted a state visit to Beijing where he met with 
Xi Jinping to consolidate the relationship between the two countries and work out the 
acquisition of the Piraeus Port (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People Republic of China, 
2016). Then in August 2016, COSCO, has purchased 51% stakes of the Piraeus Port for 280.5 
million euros (approx. $311.36 million), making it one of the biggest inbound FDIs from China 
to a European country (Seaman et al., 2017, p.71). The timeline sees 2016 as the year of the 
begin of the Greek dissenting behaviour in the EU and the year of the income of heavy 
investments from China in Greece, arguably suggesting that an answer to our question has 
already been found. Chinese investments have had an impact on Greece’s behaviour in the EU, 
pushing it to have a more pro-China stands which more or less willingly gave the image of a 
disrupted and unstable EU, uncapable of acting as a unified actor. Thus, the research question 
could be easily answered by saying that Chinese FDIs have an impact on European integration 
when the amount of such is considerable in the host country.  
 
However, this solution presents a problem, which is the continued collaborative behaviour of 
Italy at EU level. In fact, a year earlier, in 2015, another state-owned Chinese company, 
ChemChina, made a significant investment of 7,527 million euros (approx. $8,354.97 million4) 
in Italy for the acquisition of an important Italian company, Pirelli. Making Italy the biggest 
                                                           
4 The exchange rate EUR-USD used here was the one of 2016, as for the other exchanges. 
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receiver of FDIs coming from China in 2015 (Seaman et al., 2017, p.81). If the reasoning 
applied to Greece was valid, then, Italy too should have displayed a disruptive behaviour 
towards the EU in China-related issues. However, it has not done so, discrediting the solution 
presented above.  
 
Thus, the comparison between the case of the Piraeus Port in Greece and Pirelli in Italy has 
shown that the amount of FDIs is not the circumstance that can explain the diverse outcome in 
behaviour towards the EU. However, other aspects of Chinese FDIs might reveal a more 
interesting and useful result. Thus, in the following paragraphs the response given by the two 
societies to investments coming from China and, most importantly, the significance of such 
investments for the national economy (interest) will be addressed.  
 
The first difference mentioned is the response Chinese FDIs obtained in the receiving countries. 
As it was shown in the section presenting the case studies, Greeks have been displaying a more 
positive opinion of China, its products and its capital than Italians (Pew Research Center, 2014) 
(Eurobarometer, 2017). Such positive or negative public opinion influences both the public and 
the private spheres. At public level, political representatives in order to be (re-)elected say and 
do what is more likely to please their electorate (Putnam, 1988). If China has a good reputation 
among the citizens of a country, it is more likely for such country to keep striking an increasing 
amount of deals with China, but if it does not, then, it is as likely that there will be fewer 
agreements. Of course, this is an over-simplification of the influence that constituencies have 
on their political representatives, there are also cases in which representatives do not act in 
accordance with public opinion, nevertheless, since we are looking at the general behaviour of 
a country in an international setting, the rule and not exception will be considered. At private 
level there is an even more direct connection; if the reputation of China and its products is 
positive, for businesses, it can present a chance to increase the markets and the number of 
clients, but if China and/or its products have a bad reputation, then a company that is known to 
be involved with it might lose clients and see its (internal) market shrink. Greece and Italy 
furnish the perfect examples of the scenarios presented.  
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In Greece, China is fairly well seen, and its people, products and capital welcomed, thus, the 
government and companies have an incentive in furthering their relationship with Chinese 
partners. In Italy, China has a very poor reputation and this is mirrored in the idea that Chinese 
products are cheap and of very low quality (Noci, 2017). Italy witnesses the paradoxical 
situation in which businesses are eager of doing more business with China, but public opinion 
functions as restrain for such desire (Seaman et al., 2017, p.86).  This is further exacerbated by 
the importance of the manufacturing industry for the Italian economy, which puts it 
automatically in competition with China. China itself is a manufacturing country that manages 
to offer extremely competitive prices which Italy is unable to offer, casting on the peninsula the 
shadow of a future with a smaller market and loss of jobs, situation that would obstruct the 
achievement of its interest (Harney, 2008). As far as the public opinion on China and the EU is 
concerned, different trends have been witnessed in the two case studies; Greeks seem to have 
higher levels of favourability for China than for the EU, while Italians have displayed the 
opposite opinion (see section 5.4 and 5.5). In conclusion, at the current state, it is much easier 
for Greece’s representatives than for Italy’s to a- further the relations with China and b- speak 
up in favour of China against the overall position of the EU. Although this might partially 
explain why Greece took a pro-China stand at EU level causing disruption while Italy did not, 
it is still not sufficient to fully understand what has pushed Greece to act in such a subversive 
way in the first place. 
 
The explanation of what might have triggered such behaviour in Greece can be found in the 
(potential) significance of Chinese FDIs for the countries’ economy. The section dedicated to 
case studies described Greece as an ‘importer’ country with a weak and small economy and that 
in the past has struggled in finding actors willing to relevantly invest in its economy (Tonchev 
& Davarinou, 2017). Italy, however, has been presented as an ‘exporter’ country with a strong 
and large economy which, historically, has been able to attract investors in its country (Infodata, 
2017). Having different types of economies which are also in different conditions, they then, 
have different means to achieve their interests. 
 
Now, it is necessary to explore what role Chinese FDIs play in relation with national interest, 
remember that five criteria have been established to assess the significance of Chinese FDIs for 
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the national interest; (a) amount, (b) impact on GDP, (c) receiving sectors, (d) timing and (e) 
future possibilities. Since ‘importers’ rely more on external capital and products for the 
functioning of their economies than ‘exporters’, the importance of Foreign Direct Investments 
is likely to be higher for them than for ‘exporters’(Tsitouras, 2016). FDIs contribute to the 
incoming capital which the national economy is heavily based on, while ‘exporters’ can draw 
from other sources to support their economy (see section 5.2.1). However, China offered to 
both easy-to-get, ready-to-go and conspicuous FDIs, but the ‘importing’ Greek economy 
needed them more than the ‘exporting’ Italian.  Thus, such investments present a better match 
for the interests of Greece than of Italy since they have the potential of being more impactful 
for its GDP (Tsitouras, 2017). 
 
Italy has a stronger and larger economy (OEC, 2018) and thus, has larger and stronger basis for 
growth. It has more, in numbers and amount, means to guarantee economic growth and thus, 
more options available in general to support its economy. Greece being a smaller and weaker 
economy (OEC, 2018) is per definition more fragile; its sources of revenue are limited, in 
amount and numbers, as are its options to support the growth of its economy. Thus, Greece 
needs to make sure that those sources keep existing and are working properly. For example, 
after the financial crisis, the already small and not particularly strong Greek economy further 
shrank and weakened, leaving Greece in a very complicated and unstable situation that pushed 
the country to the edge of failure (Freeman, 2015). The crisis heavily hit Italy too, but since 
Italy had a larger and stronger starting point, the after-crisis situation was less drastic than the 
Greek one (see fig.5).  
 
In such conditions, it was in the interest of Greece to find a fast and substantial solution to its 
dramatic economic situation, however, the moment in which Greece needed foreign capital the 
most to make its economy recover, was also the moment in which such capital was lacking the 
most as markets had lost trust in the economy and investors were fleeing the country (McCurry, 
2015). Then, at the right time, China stepped in offering not only to largely invest into the 
country, but also to help with its sovereign debt (Varoufakis, 2017). Rejecting such possibility 
would have gone against the interest of Greece, as it would have turned down one of the limited 
means available that could help it surviving. 
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A similar offer was made available for Italy, in fact, both in Greece and Italy, Chinese 
investments fuell(ed) important sectors of the economy. However, by comparing the 
information given in section 5.2.1 and 5.4, one could argue that Chinese investments better 
match sectors that are important for the economy in Greece than in Italy. For example, while 
tourism, an extremely important source of revenue for Greece (see section 5.2.1), is among the 
top destinations of Chinese capital (see section 5.4), manufactory is missing from the list of the 
top destinations of Chinese investments in Italy, even though it covers an extremely important 
role for the country’s economy. While in Italy, China has become an important investor, but 
one of the many (Santander Trade Portal, 2017), in Greece, China came as a saviour, bringing 
the chance of receiving important and stable investments for a long period of time in a moment 
in which Greece was struggling in keeping its economy together (Tonchev & Davarinou, 2017). 
This research will not go as far as saying that Greece felt like it owned something to China, but 
surely, the big amount offered (a), as proven by the actions of COSCO, and thus its potential 
impact on the Greek GDP (b), the selection of receiving sectors and the role they cover in the 
national economy (c)(see section 5.4), the perfect timing (d) and the promise of a flourishing 
future relationship (e), including future inflow of capital, made Chinese investments 
particularly significant for Greece, but not as much for Italy.  
 
To sum up, China presents Greece with the opportunity of a reliable and stable source of 
incoming capital for the future of the country and thus, a precious, if not unique, resource to 
reach economic prosperity. For Italy, Chinese FDIs offer a good source of investments in some 
sectors important for its economy and indeed a contribution to the post-crisis recovery process, 
but they have not reached the significance they have for Greece. However, it would be naïve 
not to recognise that China could potentially play a similar role in Italy to the one played in 
Greece, as Italy has been going through an extremely difficult post-crisis recovery hence, could 
benefit from extra help. However, as discussed in the part regarding the response to Chinese 
FDIs, most likely the competition in the manufacturing sector and the reputation of Chinese 
products in the country hinder such possibility, resulting in the labelling of China more as a 
problem/menace than an advantage for the achievement of Italian interests (see section 5.4). 
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Thus, it has been shown how Chinese investments match more the interests of Greece than of 
Italy, now the connection between Chinese FDIs and the dissenting behaviour will be assessed. 
 
We have seen how it has not been easy for Greece to find an investor with the characteristics 
China offers, mainly when an economy is going through difficult times. Usually, strong 
economies have such abilities, but those economies were reluctant after the crisis ( CIA, 2018). 
We have also seen how to keep Chinese investments flowing was and still is more in the interest 
of Greece than in Italy’s. However, in order to secure the continuous inflow of Chinese capital 
in the country, Greece has to build a good relationship with China, in fact, in the document 
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (2016) after Tsipras’ state visit to 
Beijing is explicitly stated that ‘China regards Greece as a strategic partner in the European 
Union (EU). Under current international situation, both ancient civilizations should join hands 
to consolidate political mutual trust and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, so as to 
promote China-Greece as well as China-EU comprehensive strategic partnerships to another 
new level. Xi Jinping stressed that China and Greece should intensify high-level exchanges, 
and continuously understand and support each other in issues concerning respective core 
interest and major concerns’. After these premises, the investments in the Piraeus Port are 
mentioned, using a sequencing of contents and wording that somehow indirectly links the 
inflow of Chinese investments to the reciprocal support of the two countries in helping each 
other achieving their interests. 
 
This furnishes an explanation of why Greece, and not Italy, went publicly against the EU 
position to take a pro-China stand; the aim was most likely to show to China that Greece was a 
reliable partner in Europe and that it ‘had its back’. Such actions were probably aimed more at 
pleasing China than at disrupting the EU. After all, its dissent would have had little repercussion 
on the benefits Greece receives from the EU, but a positive impact on its relationship with China, 
from which Greece can still obtain more. Nevertheless, because of their unusual nature, 
externally, they ended up offering to the world the image of a divided and weak Europe that 
struggles in speaking and acting as unified actor and internally, they have created a situation in 
which China and China-related issues play the role of the ‘elephant in the room’ in debates at 
EU level. 
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However, in May 2016, a few months the purchase by COSCO of the shares of the Piraeus Port, 
Greece, and Italy, expressed a vote in favour of the EU position and against China, rejecting 
the proposal of granting the PRC the Market Economy Status (MES). Now, based on such 
evidence, one could argue that Chinese investments do not have a negative impact on the EU 
integration process and the disruptive behaviour of Greece has nothing to do with Chinese FDIs 
(VoteWatch, 2018). Nevertheless, far from hindering the main hypothesis, such episode simply 
further shows the centrality of interests in the EU integration process. To reject the granting of 
the MES to China was in Greece’s own interest. The MES implies that ‘the government of a 
given country does not interfere in production processes or price levels and thus does not disturb 
international competition’, hence, ‘anti-dumping’ rules and other ad-hoc regulations would not 
apply to such country. In the case of China, among other things, MES would have meant the 
loss of several jobs all around Europe, which would have gone against the country’s interest 
(Wnukowski, 2016). In 2016, China was becoming an important partner for Greece, however, 
European countries such as Germany and Italy were still more important to support the Greek 
economy; the German and Italian economies, in particular, would have strongly suffered if 
MES was to be grated to China, endangering the Greek economy too (Wnukowski, 2016). If 
this is not sufficient to understand why was in the interest of Greece to vote against such 
proposal, researchers have calculated that granting China the MES would have probably led to 
a deeper trade deficit between the EU and China (Wnukowski, 2016), which would have gone 
against the interest of Greece, as it would have put the country in an even more disadvantageous 
position as China’s economic partner. Thus, in accordance with the other episodes and with the 
intergovernmentalist theory, also in this occasion, Greece has behaved out of what was in its 
interests. Furthermore, when the voting happened, in May, Tsipras was still to make his state 
visit to Beijing and the deal on the Piraeus Port yet to be struck, further strengthening the idea 
that 2016, or better July 2016, signed a turning point in the relationship of Greece with China 
and thus, with the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People Republic of China, 2016). 
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Chapter VI. Results 
 
 
The results of the analysis and of the research seem to support H1; Chinese FDIs appear to be 
exercising a negative impact on the European integration process when they match the interest 
of the member states. It must be stressed one more time that whether this outcome is the result 
of Chinese will or not is not relevant for the aim of the research. According of the most-similar 
systems design the explanation of the phenomenon (the different level of EU integration) lays 
in the differences in the independent variable (Chinese FDIs). Nevertheless, the episodes 
mentioned which display disruption from the side of Greece and not from the Italian one, show 
that the mere presence of Chinese FDIs does not automatically result in a country adopting a 
disruptive behaviour in the EU and taking a pro-China position. Thus, it has been necessary to 
explore under which circumstances and which aspects of the FDIs influenced the adoption of 
this kind of behaviour. The analysis has revealed that, at least up to this moment, the amount of 
investments on its own has not played a discerning role; both Greece and Italy have received 
relevant amount of investments from China and both have been the destination of a particularly 
big project; Piraeus Port in Greece and Pirelli in Italy (Seaman et al., 2017, pp.71-81). Thus, 
the presence and amount of FDIs should be disregarded as circumstances under which Chinese 
FDIs have a negative impact on the EU integration process. However, as far as the importance 
of the receiving sectors is concerned, although Chinese investments are present in important 
sectors of both economies, they seem to be better matching the sectors important for the Greek 
economy than for the Italian one (see section 5.2.1 and 5.4).  
 
In both case studies the differences identified related to Chinese FDIs (response and 
significance) seem to be firmly connected to the type and condition of the national economies, 
as starting point to better understand how FDIs can help them achieving their interest; economic 
prosperity. Greece has proven to possess certain characteristics: 1- it has an import-oriented 
economy, while Italy is export-oriented, 2- has in the past struggled to attract conspicuous and 
stable investments, while Italy has succeeded in doing so, 3- has an economy that is weak and 
small, while Italy is the fourth largest economy of the EU and 4- the fairly positive reputation 
China has in Greece allows both the public and the private sector to further their relations with 
the country and present a chance for future development. In Italy, however, the negative 
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reputation is contributing at hindering the role that Chinese investments could potentially have 
(had) in contributing to the Italian economy. 
 
Chinese FDIs possess particular characteristics which makes them an excellent match to 
achieve Greece’s interests; in addition to being (potentially) large in amount (a), easy to get,  
promptly delivered and aimed at important sectors of the receiving economy (c),  Chinese 
investments have the potential to keep increasing in the future and being available in the years 
to come and (e) to contribute to the growth of the economy (b), even in (eventual) times of 
crisis when other investors and partners might leave (d), as proven by past records (see section 
3.2). By looking at the characteristics here presented regarding the case studies and Chinese 
FDIs, it becomes clearer why these are more significant for the achievement of the interest of 
countries like Greece than like Italy. Losing the opportunity offered by Chinese investments 
would completely go against the interests of countries that possess similar economic 
characteristics to Greece. These are, however, less significant for countries sharing the 
economic characteristics of Italy. Furthering the relationship and attracting even more capital 
would be in favour of their interests, in order to do so, however, they have to remain in good 
(or even better than good) terms with China, this desire could push them to act in favour of 
China and, if deemed necessary and in the county’s interest, take its side over the EU one in 
order to secure the continue inflow of capital which their countries are staring to rely on. As 
suggested by the behaviour adopted by Greece after the states visit on July 2016. Thus, also the 
risk of developing high levels of dependency from China is lower in countries like Italy than 
like Greece, once again, due to their different economic characteristics. The higher risk of 
developing dependence the higher the risk of manifesting a disruptive behaviour at EU level.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis should have shown how interests play an extremely important and 
central role in the EU integration process, as argued by intergovernmentalism. At the same time, 
it should have shown how Chinese FDIs appear to match the interests of ‘importer’ countries 
with weaker and smaller economies (Greece), but less the interests of ‘exporter’ countries with 
stronger and larger economies (Italy). However, it must be repeated that Chinese FDIs could be 
significant for the interest of Italy as well, although probably still at a lower degree, but the 
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negative reputation of China and its products, plus the competition in the sector of manufactory 
hinder such potential.   
 
According to the analysis, since Chinese FDIs match the interests of certain member states 
more than others, they trigger a process that sees these countries disrupting the EU integration 
process by publicly taking the side of China over the one of the EU, as long as this remains in 
their interest. Thus, the results of the analysis support H1. 
Nevertheless, to strengthen the results presented here, further research is recommended, not 
only by broadening the spectrum of European countries analysed, but also by looking at the 
role of a factor that here occupied a marginal role; the manufacturing industry. As the analysis 
and the results suggest, such factor might play an extremely important role in the dynamics that 
regard Chinese FDIs at EU level. Future researches should focus on this factor when assessing 
the impact Chinese FDIs have on EU integration, looking at the importance the manufacturing 
sector covers for the national economy analysed and then compare it to the country positioning 
vis à vis China, as potential competitor.  
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Chapter VII. Conclusions and Policy recommendations 
 
 
In conclusion, the analysis furnished led to a result in support of the main hypothesis; Chinese 
investments have a negative impact on the European integration process when such investments 
match the interests of the member states. H1 has been tested by looking at two case studies, 
Greece and Italy, which were arbitrarily selected to fit the framework of the chosen 
methodology; most-similar systems design. The cases allowed to control for a series of variables 
that could have presented rival hypothesis, such as the disruptive behaviour of Greece being the 
result of austerity measures and/or the rise of Eurosceptic populist parties. However, since both 
elements were present in both case studies, they have been controlled for and thus, related rival 
hypotheses have been automatically eliminated.  
 
The most-similar systems design is an interesting methodology, but, as this research paper 
shows, has its limits. The main one is related to the difficulty in finding variables to be 
considered constant that are completely equal to each other, as most of the times, in social 
sciences, they share high levels of similarities, but they are not equal. In fact, similarities often 
involve a certain degree of differences between the subjects considered, as in the case of the 
comparison between Greece and Italy, these differences need to be at least acknowledged when 
using such methodology in order to avoid giving unclear information.  
 
To better test H1 and the phenomenon studied, further research is recommended. If the desire 
is to have a broader picture of the situation in the EU, the author would suggest broadening the 
spectrum of the cases by applying the same methodology adopted here, most-similar systems 
design, to more cases or by adopting a different methodology, if a more fitting option can be 
found. However, if the interest is to go more in depth, and look more specifically at the 
characteristics and situation of single countries, other methodologies such as process tracing or 
critical discourse analysis might be a better fit. The suggestions just made do not exclude the 
utility and, in some cases, necessity of the use of quantitative methods coupled with the 
proposed qualitative ones, on the contrary, such approach is encouraged. The author reiterates 
the recommendation to further look into the role of the manufacturing sector for the national 
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economy in future research regarding the phenomenon of the impact FDIs on the EU integration 
process. While researching the impact of Chinese FDIs in the EU, it has become clear that the 
importance of manufactory for the national economy might play a central role in determining 
the positioning of member states vis à vis China and its inbound investments. However, due to 
the limited time available, it was not possible to further explore such path in this paper. 
 
As far as the relation between the independent, Chinese FDIs, and the depended variable, EU 
integration, is concerned, we have seen how investments have a negative impact on the 
dependent variable when they match the interest of the member states, but we have also seen 
how certain factors play role in determining the significance of such investments for the interest 
of a country, among which the type of economy was mentioned. Although a net division 
between ‘importers’ and ‘exporters’ was here presented, it must be kept in mind that such 
classification presents a simplification of a reality that is much more variegated and that possess 
various degrees of import or export-oriented economies. 
 
Up to now, we have witnessed just a mild increase in disruptive behaviour in the EU and only 
when it has been in the interest of a country.  Although at the moment the amount of Chinese 
investments in the EU is still limited, it is growing, augmenting the probability of the 
establishment of certain degrees of dependency in countries where such investments match the 
national interests; the risk is an escalation, in numbers and intensity, of disruptive behaviours 
towards the EU in China-related matters. If that should happen, at the next occasion, a country 
like Greece might no longer have the choice to take the EU side over the Chinese one; not 
necessarily because China asks it to do so, but because in the meantime such country has 
become so reliant on Chinese capital that China will not even have to ask; afraid of losing such 
money and getting in serious economic trouble, Greece will express any vote that might please 
China. As stressed in Chapter I, at the UN, in the past years, many African countries have been 
repositioning their voting patterns in favour of the Chinese position. Such realignment of votes 
has been argued to be the result of Chinese investments in the continent  (Raess et al., 2017, 
p.24). Thus, one might wonder how far Greece and other EU countries are from that point? Will 
they ever reach it at all? 
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Greece is not the only EU country possessing an economy with the characteristics 
(circumstances) that make Chinese investments an issue for the EU integration process. The 
crisis has exacerbated already existing difficult situations bringing to the light a series of EU 
countries which, at different degrees, share Greece’s (economic) characteristics, among which 
Easter European countries play a role of particular relevance. Thus, it would be recommended 
to include a sample of them in eventual future researches.   
 
Now, Greece, despite its recent history, seems to be a stable democracy with a functioning rule 
of law, however, it must be remembered that China is coming to the EU as an economically 
successful illiberal country. Very few words will be spent on the matter, since it was not the 
focus of this research; the Chinese model shows how countries can become less liberal and still 
be economically ‘successful’. China offers capital and the promise for economic prosperity 
without tying them to democracy or other European values, augmenting the risk of authoritarian 
escalation within the EU itself and thus, of EU disintegration, as there can be no EU without its 
funding values (Benner et al. 2018, pp.5-8). In this matter, a case previously mentioned and that 
might be interesting to further explore is Hungary, where the government led by Viktor Orbán 
is portraying high levels of illiberalism and striving to attract an increasing amount of Chinese 
investments at the same time (Seaman et at., 2017, pp-75-79). This would be the perfect subject 
for another research or to further this research, unfortunately, due to constraints this paper was 
subjected to, it was not possible to include the analysis of other countries or the (potential) 
illiberal political consequences of the Chinese model.  
 
Clearly, the current situation is far from having such extreme characteristics and the scenarios 
described in the paragraphs above, such as a stable realignment of votes in favour of China or 
the rise of illiberal regimes within the EU, might never become reality. However, as well said 
by Benjamin Franklin, ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’, thus the EU should 
take action to prevent any possibility of realisation of such outcomes. In conclusion, Chinese 
FDIs inflow in the member states have a disruptive impact on the integration process when they 
match the interests of the member states, such impact has the potential to eventually grow in 
severity. However, it must be acknowledged that in the EU, other factors and issues too seem 
to bring friction among members states, an example would be the debate over the refugee crisis 
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(BBC, 2016). Thus, it could be suggested that, at the moment, there is more than one factor 
hindering the EU integration process.   
In conclusion, this research project has managed to provide a preliminary scientific proof of the 
negative impact Chinese FDIs exercise on the behaviour of Greece vis à vis the EU and thus, 
on the European integration process itself. However, due to limits in terms of economy-related 
knowledge of the author and time, further research is strongly recommended, as previously 
mentioned. 
 
7.1 Policy Recommendations to the EU  
 
Following the results obtained which have highlighted certain circumstances under which 
Chinese FDIs have a negative impact on the EU integration process, a series of policy advices 
to tackle the issues currently witnessed and to prevent a potential escalation of the situation 
have been formulated and directed to the EU.  
 
1- Although it is already on its way, a centralised EU screening mechanism for foreign 
investments would be an effective tool to tackle the disruptive potential of FDIs, 
allowing Brussels to have more control over the incoming capital and avoiding the risk 
of any member developing high degree of dependence from Chinese foreign 
investments, or any other external actor for that matters. Nevertheless, the EU must 
create a mechanism that does not suppress the freedom of manoeuvre of its member 
states, leaving them a certain degree of freedom. 
2- At the same time, the EU has to guarantee that the economies of ‘importer’ and weaker 
states become less subjected to such risks by paying particular attention to them. The 
growth that, for example, Chinese capital would have granted, needs to be safeguarded 
and guaranteed by the EU. Otherwise, the adoption of the screening mechanism, or any 
similar action, could have the opposed result, further exacerbating differences between 
member states and heightening the Eurosceptic sentiment in those countries that already 
struggling.  
3- The EU needs to keep developing its relationship with China and it needs to do so in a 
more comprehensive and structured way. China, as any other actor, presents a source of 
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potential problems, but also resources and will try to maximize the gains from both the 
EU and China. Thus, the relationship between the two actors needs to be positive but 
controlled, which means a general EU strategy vis à vis China needs to be adopted as 
guide line for the members. China has been active in the EU for years now, but the EU 
still lacks a central response to it, leaving member states alone in deciding how to deal 
with such actor. If a EU vision of and strategy towards China is not furnished, it will 
never be possible for the EU to give a unified response to China and thus, China will 
never see or treat the EU as one actor.  
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